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ABSTRACT 
 
Establishing protection for conservation is a complicated process that involves many 
critical decisions, from spatial prioritization to garnering the necessary financial support to 
complete a project. In my research, I address questions that inform various components of 
this process. First, I ask questions about protected area design using a case study of a large 
reef system in Australia. I find that simple design rules can facilitate the pursuit of 
conservation and extractive management goals. Second, I address questions about costs 
incurred by the financing of new protection. I establish a unique dataset of projects financed 
by a conservation non-profit through an internal revolving loan. Using this loan data, I 
examine correlates of loan default which impacts both the long-term success of the 
defaulted conservation land deal, and the ability of that organization to pursue future land 
acquisition deals. Last, I partner with a large conservation non-profit to identify predictors 
of philanthropic giving to the organization. By investigating a finely resolved national 
dataset, I reveal several correlates of conservation giving, and identify regions where new 
fundraising techniques could greatly augment available resources for conservation action.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Protection as a Tool for Conservation 
Biodiversity is declining globally and the current extinction rate is estimated to be 100-
1000 times background extinction rates (Butchart et al. 2010; Barnosky et al. 2011; 
Ceballos et al. 2015; McCallum 2015). A major driver of these losses is the conversion and 
degradation of habitat as well as overexploitation of resources (McLellan et al. 2014). On 
land, urbanization and agriculture are substantial anthropogenic causes of this destruction 
(Polasky et al. 2008; Sachs et al. 2009) while in the sea, overfishing and destructive fishing 
practices contribute to major population declines (Jackson et al. 2001). The establishment 
of protected areas where extractive use and development is limited through spatial 
regulation continues to be one of the key methods for combating the loss of biodiversity 
(Margules & Pressey 2000; Sarkar et al. 2006; Joppa & Pfaff 2009). Current rates of 
protection put the international community on target to reach global goals for protected 
area coverage by 2020; unfortunately, more specific biodiversity objectives still lag far 
behind desired targets, indicating that more strategic protection is still needed (Juffe-
Bignoli et al. 2014; Tittensor et al. 2014). 
 
The general definition of protected areas agreed upon by the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the World Commission on Protected Areas, and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity describes a protected area as “a clearly defined 
geographical space, recognized, dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective 
means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services 
and cultural value” (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2013; Juffe-Bignoli et al. 2014). For my use 
of the term “protected area” in this dissertation, I will defer to this definition. Within this 
larger characterization, organizations often further classify protected areas. For instance, 
globally, the IUCN uses management and governance type as two methods to 
subcategorize protected areas (Dudley 2008; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2013). These 
include categories ranging from scientific reserve to world heritage site. In the United 
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States, the U.S. Geological Survey’s Protected Area Database assigns GAP status codes, 
which describe levels of protection ranging from “1”, land managed to mimic natural 
ecosystems and regimes, to “4”, currently unprotected or unmanaged. These categorization 
systems demonstrate the variation in interpretations that protected area can take. For 
example. GAP status code level 3 falls outside the management categories for the IUCN 
because these lands allow some extractive uses and degradation even though land is still 
protected from conversion. Regardless of the semantics, marine and terrestrial protected 
areas are universally used as a tool to prevent or slow the deterioration of natural areas due 
to land conversion, such as tilling, energy development or urbanization, as well as 
destructive harvesting practices, such as trawling, clear cutting or poaching (UNEP-
WCMC and IUCN 2016).  
 
In the marine realm, large gains in protection have been made in recent years with over 
260 million hectares of new protected areas being established between 2014 and 2016 
(UNEP-WCMC and IUCN 2016). Marine environments, particularly coastal habitats, are 
highly impacted by human pressures (Halpern et al. 2008) and are worsening with time 
(Tittensor et al. 2014). Protected areas can help mitigate these stresses, and successful 
population recoveries have been observed across a variety of regions and species where 
exploitation is prohibited (Moland et al. 2013; Guidetti et al. 2014). Marine protected areas 
(MPAs) are particularly successful in supporting fish populations when they are large and 
isolated with well-enforced regulations (Edgar et al. 2014). However, many MPAs lack 
enough funding to implement effective management and enforcement (Gill et al. 2017). 
Consequently, the global MPA network still falls short of performance goals, and strategic 
planning techniques should be pursued moving forward (Agardy, di Sciara & Christie 
2011). 
 
On land, the primary strategies for protection are land acquisition and easements (Rissman 
et al. 2007; Fishburn et al. 2009a). Over 100 million hectares of terrestrial habitat and 
inland waters have been added to the World Database on Protected Areas since 2010 (Juffe-
Bignoli et al. 2014). Public lands have long served as a foundation for the protection of 
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natural resources and biodiversity (Loomis 2002). However, historically some of these 
lands were established in an ad hoc manner, thereby diminishing the function they provide 
to certain biodiversity groups (Pressey 1994). In some countries, private land trusts play an 
increasingly prevalent role in filling the gaps left by protection in public land systems 
through new land acquisition (Albers & Ando 2003; Merenlender et al. 2004). As of 2017, 
372 certified land trusts in the U.S. protect over 20 million hectares of conservation lands 
(Land Trust Accreditation Commission 2017). Local and national land trusts make regular 
decisions regarding land acquisition (Merenlender et al. 2004; Larson, Boyer & Armsworth 
2014). Private land conservation organizations strive to be effective in their decision-
making and have demonstrated strategic behaviors in land protection (Fishburn et al. 
2009b; Fisher & Dills 2012). With the increase in size and cost of land acquisitions, deals 
have become more complex, often requiring partnerships between organizations and 
financing plans to cover upfront costs (Ginn 2005; McBryde, Stein & Clark 2005). 
Combined with increasing costs, limited funding for conservation makes finding sources 
or tools to support conservation actions even more important. 
 
Key Components and Challenges of Establishing Protected Areas  
1. Where to protect? 
Through the design of protected areas, planners strive to maximize a variety of 
ecological and human use benefits. The scientific community has tackled this problem 
in the conservation planning literature. There exists a substantial history of strategies 
for the prioritization of areas for protection (Margules, Nicholls & Pressey 1988; 
Wilson et al. 2006; Withey et al. 2012). This literature discusses how best to provide 
adequate area and connectivity of protected areas for biodiversity. Within a single 
management plan, human food and resource needs are frequently balanced against 
biodiversity habitat and resource needs (Polasky et al. 2008; Goldstein et al. 2012). In 
Boxes 1 & 2, I outline examples of protected area establishment motivated by habitat 
and connectivity priorities. 
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Conservation planning has recently ventured in a number of directions focusing on 
dynamics and uncertainty (Costello & Polasky 2004; Naidoo et al. 2006; Pressey et al. 
2007; Wilson, Carwardine & Possingham 2009). One prominent trend is considering 
uncertainty around the performance of protected areas. Examples include planning with 
consideration of future climate change or fluctuating population dynamics through 
time, which could change the conservation benefits offered by protecting different 
areas of land or sea (Halpern et al. 2006; Ando & Mallory 2012). 
 
2. When to protect? 
Another key problem addressed in the scientific literature is uncertainty around the 
feasibility of establishing protected areas through time. In marine settings, political 
climate often determines when new regulations may create protected areas, as is the 
case in Box 2. In terrestrial settings, parcels come onto the land market in a somewhat 
unpredictable pattern, and may only sometimes have a willing seller, as the example in 
Box 1 (Knight et al. 2011). This can lead to a “spend or wait” decision on the part of 
conservation organizations. Various studies have examined how opportunistic 
conservation organizations should be about acquiring available land (Drechsler & 
Wätzold 2007; McDonald-Madden et al. 2008). Additionally, there is uncertainty in 
the availability of funds through time (Costello & Polasky 2004; Drechsler & Wätzold 
2007; Larson, Boyer & Armsworth 2014). It may be difficult for conservation 
organizations to adopt ‘optimal’ acquisition strategies put forward by science if their 
available capital fluctuates greatly (Prendergast, Quinn & Lawton 1999). Taking loans 
for land acquisition is a solution to this timing constraint (McBryde, Stein & Clark 
2005; Clark 2007). Unfortunately, the current literature fails to capture this common 
behavior of conservation organizations and rarely considers costs incurred by financing 
strategies. 
 
3. How to fund protection? 
Enacting MPAs is a complicated process that requires years of cooperation and 
investment by governmental and nongovernmental groups. Initiation often requires 
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Box 1. Story of Conservation: A Land Protection Example  
The Ozark Regional Land Trust acquired a 688-hectare property, Woods Prairie, 
in southwest Missouri in 1999. (Thomas & Galbraith 2003) 
1. Where to protect? 
Large intact prairies such as the one protected here are a critical component 
of large scale planning and connectivity in the region as determined by the 
Gulf Coastal Plains and Ozarks LCC (Gulf Coastal Plains & Ozarks 
Landscape Conservation Cooperative 2013). This never-plowed remnant is 
a rare ecosystem, and provides critical habitat to many species of concern 
including migratory grassland birds, such as the greater prairie chicken 
(Tympanuchus cupido). Management allows for grazing on some portions to 
help keep down invasive weeds. This allows a balance of human uses and 
conservation gains. 
2. When to protect? 
This purchase was a big investment for a small organization. However, if 
ORLT did not acquire the parcel, it would likely be converted to agricultural 
land. They used seller financing options to pay for the property through time 
with future income.  
3. How to fund it? 
A fundraising campaign was rapidly started to help pay for the principal 
of the loan for the property. The land trust asked for both simple donations 
as well as interest free loans from private individuals. By appealing to local 
residents, ORLT was able to quickly raise $18,000 to put towards the 
purchase, and stewardship fund for the future management of Woods Prairie. 
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Box 2. Story of Conservation: A Marine Protection Example  
The United Kingdom has established a network of new marine and coastal 
protected areas over the last decade. Areas targeting marine habitat and species 
are termed Marine Conservation Zones (MCZs). One such MCZ, Offshore 
Brighton, established 86200 hectares of protected area in January 2016 (Eustice 
2016). 
4. Where to protect? 
Offshore Brighton MCZ protects deep channel habitat along the midline 
of the English Channel. The benthic habitat there is diverse with a variety of 
marine worm, starfish and clam species. Public comment periods and 
international stakeholder meetings conducted early in the design process 
allowed for creation of the MCZs with consideration of human economic 
and cultural uses. In the case of Offshore Brighton, boundaries were 
carefully drawn to not overlap with a scallop harvest area to the south used 
by French fishermen and another high traffic fishing area to the east shared 
by UK and Belgium fleets. 
5. When to protect? 
The establishment of the MCZs in the UK was inspired by the international 
conventions (Convention on Biological Diversity and Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-east Atlantic). To reach 
contribution 2020 targets set by these conventions, The UK will continue to 
grow its marine protected. Two of a planned three rounds of legislation have 
been completed, protecting 60 individual MCZs. Offshore Brighton MCZ 
was part of the second round of legislation approved in 2016.  
6. How to fund it? 
Since marine protection boundaries are a legislative determination, no cash 
allotment is required for purchasing protection; however, political capital 
and government funding for the research and planning is required. In this 
case, international obligations spurred the political motivation. Additionally, 
planning institutions consider opportunity costs of local economic uses in 
the design of potential MCZs.  
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political support, but MPA creation may use significant public funds over the course 
of the establishment process (McCrea-Strub et al. 2011). Alternatively, land protection, 
often requiring ownership, is a costly upfront investment. Many land protection 
projects are becoming larger and more expensive (Davies, Kareiva & Armsworth 
2010). Past land protection has been criticized for occurring unsystematically where 
areas of little value for agriculture or timber, such as steep or dry areas, are left 
undeveloped (Joppa & Pfaff 2009). Current land protection actions are subsequently 
often encouraged in areas of high threat of development or conversion (Pressey 1994; 
Carter et al. 2014). The higher market value of these lands makes these parcels 
expensive. Consequently, expanding resources for conservation is a critical endeavor. 
Philanthropic donations account for a large portion of non-profit conservation 
organizations’ budgets (Guidestar USA Inc. 2016) and provides a key source of income 
for protection projects (Box 1). The current literature falls short in describing the spatial 
patterns of conservation donations and the demographics associated with these 
patterns.  
 
Dissertation Outline 
In this dissertation, I examine three questions advancing the frontier of current protected 
area science. One question comes from the marine environment where population 
dynamics of target species are particularly important and much protection is done through 
regulatory action. Two questions examine terrestrial protected areas, and focus on the role 
that private land trusts play in growing the protected area network. In contrast to most 
marine settings, establishing protected areas on land often requires paying to acquire 
property rights. Therefore, for these two chapters I focus on questions tied to the emerging 
field of conservation finance. 
 
In Chapter 1, I investigate questions about MPA design. I focus on how relatively simple 
policies perform in the presence of uncertainty about complicated spatio-temporal 
population dynamics of target species. I use a model of reef fish population dynamics in 
the Great Barrier Reef to address questions about the usefulness of size and spacing rules 
8 
 
for protected areas. In particular, I aim to explore how data-limited regions may benefit 
from design rules tested on a well-studied system using simulation models with stochastic 
dispersal regimes. I find that design rules are able to balance conservation and fishery 
management goals under various scenarios of protection. 
 
With my research in Chapters 2 and 3, I transition to questions of land protection. In doing 
so, I collaborated with The Nature Conservancy (TNC) to use their rich history of land 
protection across the continental U.S. As the largest land trust in the world, TNC serves as 
an ideal case study organization for exploring questions regarding the finances of land 
acquisition. They have been actively protecting land in the US since 1955 and for decades 
have cultivated donors and implemented a revolving fund to help finance new projects 
within the organization (Birchard 2005; Kareiva, Groves & Marvier 2014). 
 
In Chapter 2, I focus on the financing of land purchases. Using loans to create capital for 
projects can be risky because of uncertainty around the ability to achieve a timely loan 
repayment. If a land trust could better understand factors that increased the risk of having 
a loan go long in repayment, then the organization could potentially avoid larger-than-
expected costs. Given this, I ask: “What characteristics of a land acquisition deal predict 
delayed loan repayments or large interest payments?” I demonstrate that there are large 
loan financing costs involved that must be accounted for when prioritizing different areas 
for protection. 
 
Chapter 3 addresses spatial patterns of fundraising for land protection. Increased financial 
support is critical to future conservation efforts and land trusts often look to the local 
communities to help support new land acquisitions (Clark 2009). Better understanding of 
philanthropic giving to conservation may aid organizations to augment funding. In Chapter 
3, I use fundraising data provided at a fine spatial grain from TNC to reveal patterns in 
philanthropic giving. I identify sociodemographic and other characteristics of a locality 
that help to predict the propensity and scale of giving across the conterminous U.S. 
Characteristics of a location such as educational attainment levels rise to the top as highly 
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predictive of giving. I also use this statistical model to illustrate how a conservation 
organization could use this analytical approach to inform fundraising efforts and discuss 
its implications for identifying areas for future protection. 
 
In my dissertation conclusion chapter, I summarize my research by revisiting this 
introduction’s general questions for establishing protected areas: When to protect? Where 
to protect? And how to fund it? Additionally, I provide synthesis and discussion of 
Chapters 1-3 on several topics including challenges of decision making under trade-off 
scenarios, the advantage of flexibility in policy and planning, as well as enabling factors 
and benefits of scaling up conservation efforts.   
10 
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CHAPTER 1 
SIZE AND SPACING RULES CAN BALANCE CONSERVATION 
AND FISHERY MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES FOR MARINE 
PROTECTED AREAS 
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Abstract  
1. Marine protected areas (MPAs) are increasingly integrated into fishery management 
for coastal systems. Size and spacing rules (SSRs) have been proposed as simple MPA 
design guidelines, especially in regions where population connectivity data are limited.  
2. I assessed whether SSRs allow managers to design effective MPA networks under 
spatiotemporally varying dispersal patterns using a spatially realistic population model 
parameterized for a commercially-exploited fish species on the Great Barrier Reef. 
3. SSRs are used to design MPA networks, and population simulations are used to 
measure the mean and variance of the resulting population size and fishery catch.  
4. I show that SSR performance is contingent on the extent of the MPA network, and 
whether species’ connectivity data can be used to target areas for protection. For 
example, in the absence of connectivity data, a ‘many small’ MPAs rule provides the 
least variable management outcome.  
5. Synthesis and applications. I demonstrate that the performance of SSRs depend on the 
level of knowledge about larval dispersal, as well as the level of current exploitation in 
the fishery. These context-dependent results offer particularly relevant guidance to 
future MPA design projects in regions with limited connectivity data. 
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Introduction 
Marine protected areas (MPAs) have become a key component of conservation and fishery 
management for near-shore ecosystems (Allison, Lubchenco & Carr 1998; Lester et al. 
2009; Banks & Skilleter 2010). Connectivity patterns that link locations of adult fish 
spawning to offspring recruitment help determine whether the spatial configuration of an 
MPA network can achieve management objectives (Botsford, Micheli & Hastings 2003; 
Costello & Polasky 2008; White et al. 2014). However, measuring connectivity in coastal 
systems is notoriously difficult (Jones et al. 2009; Cowen & Sponaugle 2009). In regions 
where this data may be unavailable or difficult to incorporate, MPA planning is based on 
general rules for the size of individual MPAs and the space between them (hereafter 
referred to as “size and spacing rules”; SSRs). SSRs offer straightforward guidance for 
network design (Hastings & Botsford 1999; Green et al. 2014), and suggest that MPAs of 
particular average size, with particular average spacing between them, can deliver both 
conservation and fisheries goals. Thus, to be useful, an SSR would need to generally 
produce superior or more consistent outcomes than alternate SSRs for fisheries 
management and/or conservation.  
 
SSRs have long been studied with theoretical models, and suggestions arising from this 
literature are used to inform real-world MPA design (Sala et al. 2002; Gleason et al. 2010; 
Fernandes et al. 2012). Models are particularly useful for working on spatial and temporal 
scales where experimentation is infeasible. Additionally, in places of high uncertainty, 
model predictions can help to direct future empirical research to resolve key uncertainties, 
perhaps in a value of information setting or as a base-line for adaptive management 
(McDonald-Madden et al. 2010; Runge et al. 2011). Many theoretical models indicate that 
conservation and fishery goals require different MPA configurations, resulting in 
management trade-offs (Kaplan & Botsford 2005; Gaines et al. 2010). Theory and some 
empirical studies have shown that fisheries outcomes are maximized when MPAs are split 
into small pieces (thereby maximizing spillover). In contrast, the conservation goal of 
larger populations is best achieved by consolidating MPAs into large continuous areas 
(Collins et al. 2002; Hastings & Botsford 2003; Claudet et al. 2008).  
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SSR studies cited by real-world MPA design, while providing useful guidelines, include 
some simplifying assumptions that could impact their performance in real-world 
applications. The population models analyzed are often spatially implicit (Nowlis & 
Roberts 1999; Hastings & Botsford 1999; Mangel 2000) or use simple patch models or 
one-dimensional linear models to represent coastlines (Hastings & Botsford 2003; Halpern 
et al. 2006; Kaplan et al. 2009; Pelc et al. 2010; Moffitt, White & Botsford 2011). MPA 
design studies often use symmetric dispersal kernels or simple advection models to 
represent larval dispersal, and these remain constant through time (Lockwood et al. 2002; 
Kaplan & Botsford 2005; Halpern et al. 2006; White et al. 2010b; Guizien et al. 2012). Yet 
larval connectivity patterns are driven by highly-variable oceanographic drivers, and are 
therefore characterized by spatial and temporal heterogeneity (McConnaughey et al. 1994; 
James et al. 2002; Harrison et al. 2012). This variability is likely to impact the performance 
and reliability of different SSRs. 
 
I therefore re-examine the performance of alternative SSRs using a spatially-explicit 
population model that includes this heterogeneity. My model is parameterized for a reef 
fish species on Australia’s Great Barrier Reef (GBR). However, in many parts of the world, 
these connectivity patterns are poorly understood, and collecting better data on dispersal is 
prohibitively expensive (Sale et al. 2005; Burgess et al. 2014). The resulting uncertainty 
makes it difficult to configure an MPA network that achieves fishery and conservation 
objectives (Botsford et al. 2009). One of the strengths of SSRs is their applicability in the 
absence of explicit data on dispersal, but managers still need to understand which SSR is 
expected to best deliver management goals. My relatively data-rich case study of the GBR 
provides an opportunity to model the performance of different MPA configurations. By 
ignoring knowledge of underlying dynamics when designing an MPA network, I mimic a 
data-deficient system and can thereby explore consequences of applying SSRs in systems 
where connectivity data are less available. Specifically, I create many test MPA 
configurations through SSRs and use simulation models to evaluate the efficacy of these 
hypothetical MPA networks.   
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I explore how the efficacy of different SSRs varies with two factors: the MPA network 
extent, and managers’ ability to use dispersal data in MPA design. Since exploitation levels 
have been identified as a guiding consideration in MPA design and success, the contrasting 
dynamics of over- and under-exploited fisheries may necessitate different design rules for 
a network (Kaplan et al. 2009; Costello et al. 2010; Gaines et al. 2010). By varying access 
to fishing in my model, I can investigate the SSR performance under a variety of protection 
levels. Though still rare, connectivity information is valuable for designing MPA networks 
and can improve configuration performance ((Sale et al. 2005; Costello et al. 2010; 
Rassweiler, Costello & Siegel 2012; Lester et al. 2013). I explore how dispersal knowledge 
level impacts the usefulness of SSRs by comparing scenarios that use no dispersal 
information in MPA placement with scenarios that have a greater capacity to pick high-
performing configurations.  
 
In this paper, I test SSRs as guidelines for management of near-shore marine systems by 
using simulation models with realistic patterns of variation in dispersal. Particular SSRs 
are useful if they can increase the likelihood of achieving above average or predictable 
management. This leads me to ask if a SSR provides (1) larger fish catch, (2) larger wild 
population size, or (3) lower variance outcomes. By observing covariation in fishery and 
conservation goals, I reveal the context dependency of scenarios where these outcomes are 
opposing or synergistic. 
 
Methods 
I begin by defining SSRs for heterogeneous marine systems. Spacing rules define the 
average distance between any two neighboring MPAs. Likewise, size rules regulate the 
average size of each MPA within the network. Size and spacing are often considered as 
independent factors, but are necessarily codependent for a given MPA network extent (Fig. 
1.4). For example, if 10% of the total reef area is protected, and if the each MPA is set to 
be 1% of total reef area, then there can be only 10 MPAs, and the average distance between 
them is subsequently more constrained. For a set total area, the network configurations can 
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range across a spectrum from many small MPAs with a short spacing distance, to a few 
large MPAs with longer average spacing distances (Fig. 1.1). 
 
Designing MPAs with SSRs  
To compare SSRs as guidelines for MPA network design, I created and simulated a wide 
variety of MPA network configurations. A spacing distance (in degrees) and a fixed total 
network area (km2) subsequently determined average MPA size. When there were N 
distinct MPAs in the network, each had approximate size (Total area protected)/N. I chose 
the site of each MPA by selecting a latitudinal point at random and building the MPA 
outwards from there, sequentially adding the closest unprotected reefs until the desired size 
was reached. Each treatment group (combination of total network extent and SSR) included 
200 MPA configurations. In the Discussion, I place these SSRs into a broader comparison 
with other rules reflecting real-world interpretations.  
 
Population model and case study 
To assess the conservation and fisheries outcomes of each configuration, I used a 
population model loosely parameterized for coral trout (Plectropomus leopardus, 
Serranidae), a commercially exploited species on the GBR that is a priority for 
management (Leigh et al. 2014; see Supplemental Materials 2 for life cycle details). My 
model tracked 13 age classes at each of 2165 discrete reef locations. Reef habitats are 
patchily distributed, and adults of most reef fish species remain closely associated with the 
reefs on which they settle at the end of a pelagic larval stage (Samoilys 1997; Jones et al. 
2009; Planes, Jones & Thorrold 2009). Dispersal was assumed to occur only during the 
larval stage and upon settlement, larvae attempting to enter the recruiting cohort experience 
density dependent mortality following a Beverton-Holt relationship (Bode et al. 2016). 
Dispersal patterns were stored in seven annual connectivity matrices, generated by a 
detailed model of larval dispersal that is based on plausible assumptions about coral trout 
life history, including pelagic larval duration and larval swimming capabilities (James et 
al. 2002; Bode et al. 2012). Physical forcing in the model was based on a high-resolution 
oceanographic model, calibrated using available current and wind data in the GBR. 
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Variable dispersal was simulated by drawing randomly each time step from the available 
matrices, each representing an annually averaged connectivity between each pair of reefs 
spanning the entire GBR (for years 1996-2002). This population dynamic model was 
overlaid with a fishing model that assumes a fixed proportion of biomass on unprotected 
reefs is annually harvested. 
 
Each MPA configuration was tested using the same model parameters. At the end of a 400-
year model run, the fishery and conservation performance of the configuration was 
evaluated by averaging over the last 50 time steps. By this time, dynamics reach a steady-
state around which values stochastically fluctuate due to the time-varying dispersal. The 
respective performance measures were the average annual catch (metric tonnes), and the 
average abundance of fish remaining on the reef (number of adults). All simulations and 
analysis were completed using a commercial software package with population dynamics 
code provided as Supplemental Materials 2 (MATLAB 9.0, 2016, The MathWorks Inc., 
Natick, Mass, United States) 
  
Analysis 
To reveal general patterns across SSRs, I tested three distinct SSRs: ‘many small’, 
‘intermediate’, and ‘few large’. When applied, these rules respectively had average spacing 
distances of 0.2, 2.1, and 4.0 latitudinal degrees, thereby creating 76, 7, and 3 protected 
areas in each configuration. Previous SSR studies often made recommendations based on 
‘average dispersal distance’ of managed species. A frequent recommendation is that the 
inter-MPA distance be twice the average dispersal distance (Halpern et al. 2006; Lockwood 
et al. 2002; Palumbi 2003; Shanks et al. 2003). Although average dispersal is hard to 
estimate in my system due to the highly asymmetric dispersal kernels, the median distance 
travelled by the simulated larvae is 110 km (approximately one latitudinal degree). My 
‘intermediate’ rule therefore approximates this common ‘twice dispersal distance’ rule. A 
larger set of SSRs did not expand my conclusions, a point I return to in the Discussion and 
provide results for additional examples in the SI.  
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Level of protection 
In spatially managed fisheries, harvests are controlled by both the amount of space open to 
fishing and the effort level allowed in the fishable areas. The total area protected (MPA 
network extent) strongly influences the performance of the MPA, regardless of the 
configuration of the network (Claudet et al. 2008). In my study, I only control the level of 
exploitation by varying the MPA network extent, with a constant effort level on 
unprotected areas. Consequently, the amount of area protected is inversely related to 
exploitation (Mangel 1998, 2000; Hastings & Botsford 1999). To see how this coverage 
interacts with spacing rules, I created MPA configurations that covered 10%, 20%, 30%, 
and 40% of the total reef area. These protection levels encompass the size of no take MPAs 
currently present in the GBR (Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority 2005). This results 
in a total of 12 treatment groups (3 SSRs; 4 levels of protection). 
 
Knowledge level 
I first configured MPA networks with the assumption that managers were entirely 
uninformed about larval dispersal patterns and their effect on important locations for 
MPAs. I then assessed how information on larval dispersal would improve network 
performance by separately analyzing results from the best performing MPA configurations 
within each treatment group, on the assumption that connectivity information would allow 
managers to identify better networks. The top 10% from each group were chosen by 
normalizing and giving equal weight to both outcome metrics. This provided a set of near-
dispersal-optimal solutions. Narrowing to identify the single best solution for a given SSR 
is infeasible due to the large set of potential networks, and lengthy run-time required for 
each candidate network. However, I show that this post hoc estimation is a sufficient way 
to approximate the management outcomes of near optimal performances in the appendix 
(Fig 1.7). I will refer to the full set of configurations as ‘dispersal uninformed’ and the top 
10% subset as the ‘informed’ scenario. 
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Visualization 
Each MPA configuration evaluated with the simulation model has two associated success 
metrics, fishery catch and abundance. Therefore, a configuration can be plotted as a point 
(arrow, Fig 1.3A) in two-dimensional objective space. All 200 configurations from the 
same treatment group can be plotted in the same way (cloud of points, Fig 1.3A). This 
reveals the variable performance of different MPA configurations that share an SSR and 
protection level. In Fig. 1.3A, this uncertainty is visually summarized by a crosshatch, 
displaying the median, 1st and 3rd quartiles. Following a single color (a single SSR) 
horizontally across the plot, shows how protection level changes performance. I compare 
SSRs by observing a single shape grouping.  
 
Statistical tests 
The predicted catch and abundance are characterized by skew and by pronounced 
heteroscedasticity. To address my questions about differences in the average trend for 
outcomes, I bootstrapped my performance results and tracked the median for both fishery 
catch and abundance. I report 95% confidence intervals on these values; non-overlapping 
CIs are stated as differences in median outcomes for different SSRs, which provide a 
relatively conservative test for differentiation (Efron 1987). Similarly, to address my 
questions about differences in the variance for outcomes under alternate SSRs, I 
bootstrapped my data and tracked the 1st and 3rd quartiles for both catch and abundance. I 
calculated the difference between these values (i.e., the 1-3 interquartile range) and report 
95% confidence intervals on this difference. Non-overlapping CIs are stated as differences 
in the variance of SSRs. This procedure was applied to both the informed and uninformed 
scenarios. 
 
Results 
No single SSR is the optimal choice across scenarios. Instead, the best of the three general 
rules tested is contingent on both the level of protection (network extent and harvest 
proportion) as well as the knowledge level, or managers’ ability to identify and target 
advantageous locations using dispersal information (Table 1.1; Fig. 1.3). The following 
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sections show how the choices of rule and information level affect my desirable outcomes: 
(1) high fishery catch, (2) high population abundance, and (3) low variance. I additionally 
describe patterns of covariation in these outcomes. Fig. 1.3 shows the covariance in 
measured objectives of all tested MPA configurations. The median values plotted are 
reported in Appendix A with bootstrapped 95% CI. 
 
Fishery objective 
To address whether a particular SSR produces high catches, I compare spacing rules within 
a set percent coverage. For ‘dispersal uninformed’ scenarios, figure 1.3A shows that the 
catch generated does not vary between SSRs at lower levels of protection (10-20% of GBR 
protected). However, as the network extent increases (30-40% protected) the ‘many small’ 
spacing rules generate clearly the highest median catches (non-overlapping 95% CI of the 
median, Table 1.2). The ‘informed’ networks contrast these results (Fig 1.3B). With a low 
level of protection (10%), ‘few large’ is statistically superior to the alternative rules (Table 
1.2), generating fishery outcomes that are 8% larger than the ‘many small’ rule. At mid-
range levels of protection (20-30%) SSRs show few substantive differences in fishery 
outcomes; however, at high levels of protection, ‘many small’ gives fishery catch 11% 
higher than the ‘few large’ rule (Table 1.2). 
 
Conservation objective 
By again comparing SSRs within a coverage group, I address my second question: Does 
one SSR perform best for fish population abundance? For ‘dispersal uninformed’ 
scenarios, almost none of the SSRs generate significantly larger fish abundances. The 
exception is the ‘few large’ rule at 30% protection, which outperforms the other rules (Fig. 
1.3A). In other words, in the absence of information on connectivity patterns, SSRs cannot 
guarantee an abundance that is higher than random expectation (overlapping 95% CI, Table 
1.3). The ‘informed’ MPA networks present a dramatically different result (Fig. 1.3B). 
Across all levels of protection assessed, the ‘few large’ rule provides a consistently higher 
fish abundance, between 11% and 23% higher than the ‘many small’ rule (Table 1.3) 
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Consistency in objective 
The distance between 1st to 3rd quartile values of each treatment group measures the extent 
to which SSRs may provide consistent management outcomes. Comparing this difference 
value within a coverage group reveals patterns in variance across SSRs. For all ‘dispersal 
uninformed’ coverage scenarios, the ‘many small’ spacing rule exhibits lower variance 
than other spacing rules. This is true for both fishery catch and abundance outcomes. In 
contrast, no differences in variance are observed in the ‘informed’ scenario (Table 1.4 & 
Table 1.5). 
 
Covariation of objectives 
Each spacing rule, applied to a range of different levels of protection, produces a unique 
pattern of covariation between catch and abundance. In Fig. 1.3 this can be seen by 
following a single pacing rule (e.g. ‘many small’) from 10% to 40% coverage levels. As 
the level of protection increases, abundance increases monotonically but fishery catch 
increases and then decreases. This result mirrors the predictions of theoretical models 
(Mangel 2000; White et al. 2010a; Lester et al. 2013). For more on this pattern, see Fig. 
1.5. 
 
These covariance relationships resemble those that determine a maximum sustainable 
fishery catch. For each SSR, this peak in the catch-abundance curve can be achieved at a 
particular level of protection. For example, the location of this maximum catch is near 30% 
protection for the ‘intermediate’ rule (Fig. 1.6). Overall, this increasing-decreasing fishery 
catch pattern holds across all spacing rules in both ‘dispersal uninformed’ and ‘informed’ 
scenarios; however,  
the dimensions of the curves vary among spacing rules. For example, the maximum catch 
point shifts from 40% for a ‘many small’ spacing rule to near 25% for the ‘few large’ 
spacing rule (Fig. 1.6). 
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Discussion 
Designing networks of near-shore marine protected areas is a challenging task (Botsford, 
Micheli & Hastings 2003; Banks & Skilleter 2010). Simple rules about the size and spacing 
of network MPAs have been proposed as heuristic methods for incorporating dynamics of 
larval dispersal, even in the absence of such information. Though results from simple 
theoretical models support this approach, it is important to assess whether these results 
hold in a more realistic system. Here, I explore whether general SSRs aid MPA design by 
using a data-rich case study of a single-species on the GBR. I found that among SSRs 
tested, some generate consistently superior results, but rule selection varies with the level 
of protection, as well as the level at which connectivity information is used to target top 
configurations. 
 
The effectiveness of SSRs depends heavily on the total extent of MPA network. When the 
fishery is overexploited, it is most effectively improved by boosting standing fish 
population – a win-win scenario. So, following a SSR that increases population also 
increases fishery outcomes (left hand column, Table 1.1). Among my low protection 
‘dispersal uninformed’ MPAs, no rule provides markedly better outcomes; however, as the 
ability to choose high-performing configurations improves (‘informed’ scenario), well-
placed clustered MPAs most effectively improve population size, and thus fishery catch. 
As higher protection decreases fishable areas and boosts fish populations, a ‘many small’ 
rule consistently demonstrates higher fishery catch compared to other spacing rules, 
through spillover from protected to fished areas (right-hand column, Table 1.1). Therefore, 
when population levels are healthy and resilient, splitting up MPAs into small segments 
helps to maximize the fishery output. My results reinforce the recognized influence of 
exploitation levels on marine planning and SSR performance (Quinn, Wing & Botsford 
1993; Kaplan et al. 2009; Gaines et al. 2010).  
 
Managers’ understanding of larval dispersal patterns and ability to respond to these patterns 
through spatial targeting can affect the performance of SSRs. Many regions globally do 
not have information on larval connectivity, despite its value to spatial management. 
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Further, in complex systems, multi-species management with social, economic and 
political constraints hinder the ability to exclusively use dispersal patterns for MPA design 
providing another setting in which generalized SSRs may be useful (Roberts et al. 2003 
Nardi et al. 2004; Smith et al. 2010; Moffitt, White & Botsford 2011; White et al. 2013). 
For a successful design and implementation process, stakeholder groups across a wide 
range of values and interests, from recreational users to traditional use fishermen need to 
be consulted and their needs considered against biological ones. (Klein et al. 2008). Recent 
examples of this process have been documented for the California Marine Life Protection 
Act (Gleason et al. 2010) and the United Kingdom’s Marine Conservation Zone (Ashworth 
et al. 2010, MAIA 2011). When SSRs configure MPA networks without employing 
knowledge of underlying connectivity patterns, only the ‘many small’ rule is useful, since 
it lowers the variability of management outcomes, and sometimes improving fishery catch 
(top row, Table 1.1). Conversely, when examining the best performing MPA networks 
(‘informed’ scenario), conservation benefits and trade-offs appear among different rules 
(bottom row, Table 1.1). Contiguous MPAs can increase both fishery catch and standing 
biomass under low levels of protection. When the fishery is better protected, there is a 
trade-off in rules reflecting theoretical expectations (Hastings & Botsford 2003; Kaplan & 
Botsford 2005; Gaines et al. 2010). Therefore, if knowledge about connectivity can be used 
to identify and target important regions for protection, it may be beneficial to cluster 
protection in key areas, creating fewer, larger MPAs (Mace & Morgan 2006; Carter et al. 
2014).  
 
Finally, my model illustrates how heterogeneity in reef location and dispersal patterns 
creates variation in management outcomes among alternate MPA networks. However, I 
show the possibility to reduce this variance among alternative configurations with a ‘many 
small’ rule. In real management scenarios with limited knowledge and a high level of 
uncertainty, reducing variance in performance could be a central goal (Halpern et al. 2006). 
Generally, I present results as a risk neutral decision-maker, by comparing median 
performances to maximize the expected result. However, broad variation in potential 
outcomes allows for diverse interpretations according to risk preferences. A risk-adverse 
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designer might compare the worst outcomes in each SSR and select the one that minimizes 
chances of negative outcomes. Alternatively, a risk-tolerant designer may compare best 
outcomes under each SSR (much like my ‘informed’ scenario). As knowledge about the 
system is resolved, variation in management outcomes is reduced (Fig. 1.3B), meaning the 
choices that would be recommended across a range of risk preferences become more 
similar. A clear example of risk trade-offs can be seen in the ‘uninformed’ 10% coverage 
catch performance. Here, the ‘many small’ SSR’s lack of bad outcomes make it a strong 
choice for risk-averse decision-makers while top performances under ‘few large’ attract 
risk-tolerant designers. So, although median management outcomes are indistinguishable 
among SSRs, differences in variation may still inform MPA design.  
 
Further assumptions of human behavior and interpretation may also impact my findings. 
Here I highlight those addressed with sensitivity analysis or suggested for extension work. 
First, results may be contingent on the method I used to choose MPA configurations, or 
my interpretation of ‘spacing rule’. Accordingly, I explored alternative placement 
mechanisms that imposed stricter spatial stratifications to ensure my random placement of 
MPAs was not strongly skewing my results (Table 1.7). Moreover, I examined a more 
complete range of spacing distances. Many real-world SSR recommendations suggest a 
best spacing distance, but all spacing distances tested fell along the same continuum drawn 
by my three core SSRs (many small, intermediate, and few large). For example, 
configurations with a SSR ‘median dispersal distance’ (110 km) perform between the 
‘many small’ and ‘intermediate’ outcomes (Fig 1.8). Using habitat type to specify the 
distribution of MPAs is another possible interpretation of MPA spacing (Fernandes et al. 
2012). I compared my outcomes against a spacing method that uses 31 defined bioregions 
in the GBR to configure MPAs (Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority 2005). This 
‘bioregional’ rule performs better than or equal to my spacing rules in terms of fishery 
catch and performs almost as well as the ‘few large’ rule in maintaining a large fish 
abundance (Fig 1.8). Here, extra information about habitat delineations is incorporated into 
the design process, and like better dispersal knowledge, improved performance of resulting 
MPAs.  
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To allow MPA size to represent over- to under-exploited scenarios (Stelzenmüller et al. 
2008;), my simple representation of fishing pressure ignores displacement. The use of a 
displacement (Smith & Wilen 2003) or spatially-explicit fishing model (Lester et al. 2013) 
would be a logical extension of this work. Extensions could also consider other costs and 
policy implications related to MPA configuration type. A variety of issues arise as 
protected areas become smaller and less clustered. (Roberts et al. 2003). Accessibility for 
fishing and recreation may be more difficult, and dispersed MPAs require greater 
enforcement effort (Kritzer 2004; Davis et al. 2015). Alternatively, a few large MPAs 
could have disproportionate spatial impacts on fishing communities (Halpern et al. 2013). 
Such additional social costs will affect the relative benefits of the different SSRs.  
 
My study also made many biological and environmental assumptions. First, my model 
incorporates stochasticity only in the dispersal dynamics, but uncertainty, heterogeneity, 
and stochasticity exist across the entire ecosystem. For example, although I test a design 
rule using bioregional definitions, uncertainty exists in habitat type delineation which may 
strongly impact MPA design (Tulloch et al. 2013). Exploring stochasticity in the survival 
and growth parameters in the population dynamics would allow for exploration of MPA 
configuration resilience to catastrophic events. This may be an important extension as 
consideration of catastrophes has been shown to change the extent and design of near-shore 
MPAs (Allison et al. 2003; Game et al. 2008). Nevertheless, I performed a sensitivity 
analysis of the main parameters controlling my population dynamic model. Results of these 
sensitivity analyses did not change qualitative patterns (Table 1.6). 
 
In conclusion, SSRs can provide information relevant to MPA network design, but the 
performance of different rules is contingent on a range of factors, principally the state of 
the fishery, and managers’ ability to identify important areas based on dispersal patterns. 
Real-world variation in success of MPA networks (Lester et al. 2009; Gaines et al. 2010) 
may be influenced by the interacting effects of fishery state and design capability. 
Regardless, I show that variance in performance in MPA outcomes can be reduced by 
adopting a ‘many small’ MPA strategy. These results should be considered when managers 
32 
 
are developing new near-shore MPA networks especially when limited in their knowledge 
about or ability to respond to connectivity patterns. 
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Appendix 1: Tables 
 
Table 1.1 Key results for MPA design scenarios 
 
 
  
 
Protection Level 
Low 
10%, 20% 
High 
30%, 40% 
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Little difference 
Rarely a spacing rule performs 
better for fishery catch or 
abundance 
‘Many small’ 
A ‘many small’ spacing rule 
performs better for median fishery 
catch 
D
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In
fo
rm
ed
 ‘Few large’ 
A ‘few large’ spacing rule 
performs better for median fishery 
catch and abundance 
Trade-off 
A ‘many small’ spacing rule 
performs better for fishery catch; 
a ‘few large’ rule performs better 
for abundance 
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Table 1.2 Confidence intervals of median fishery catch 
To quantify differences in median catch values, each treatment group sample is bootstrapped for its median catch value. Listed are 
the 95% confidence intervals (lower/median/upper) for the bootstrapped median values of fishery catch (thousand tonnes). Results 
are highlighted in bold when the 95% CI do not overlap between spacing rules. 
  
 
Protection Level 
10% 20% 30% 40% 
     
K
n
o
w
le
d
g
e 
L
ev
el
 
Dispersal 
uninformed 
Many Small 5.1/5.2/5.3 6.1/6.3/6.4 6.7/6.8/7.0 6.9/7.0/7.1 
Intermediate 4.3/4.5/4.6 5.5/5.9/6.1 6.0/6.2/6.4 5.5/5.7/6.0 
Few Large 4.3/4.6/5.0 5.0/5.5/5.8 5.2/5.5/5.8 5.0/5.3/5.5 
Informed 
Many Small 6.1/6.2/6.4 7.1/7.2/7.4 7.8/7.9/8.0 7.9/8.0/8.2 
Intermediate 6.2/6.4/6.5 7.7/7.9/8.1 7.9/8.1/8.2 7.3/7.4/7.7 
Few Large 6.5/6.7/7.0 7.5/7.7/8.0 7.1/7.5/8.1 6.4/7.2/7.6 
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Table 1.3 Confidence intervals of median abundance 
To quantify differences in median abundance values, each treatment group sample is bootstrapped for the median abundance value. 
Listed are the 95% confidence intervals (lower/median/upper) for the bootstrapped median values of adult abundance (millions of 
fish). Results are highlighted in bold when the 95% CI do not overlap between spacing rules. 
  
 
Protection Level 
10% 20% 30% 40% 
     
K
n
o
w
le
d
g
e 
L
ev
el
 
Dispersal 
uninformed 
Many Small 124/126/129 179/181/185 239/242/244 295/299/305 
Intermediate 107/111/117 175/183/192 231/240/250 290/300/307 
Few Large 115/124/131 183/191/202 253/264/277 304/321/335 
Informed 
Many Small 149/152/157 210/212/220 273/279/283 330/333/339 
Intermediate 149/154/160 233/240/245 286/298/313 362/366/373 
Few Large 174/181/184 256/261/271 335/341/357 360/371/397 
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Table 1.4 Confidence intervals of fishery catch variance magnitude 
To quantify differences in variance of recorded catch in alternate treatment groups, the sample is bootstrapped for the 1st and 3rd 
quartile values. Listed are the 95% confidence intervals (lower/median/upper) for the difference between the bootstrapped 1st and 
3rd quartile values. This difference (75th percentile – 25th percentile) corresponds to the magnitude of the variance in the values of 
fishery catch (thousand tonnes). Results are highlighted in bold when the 95% CI do not overlap between spacing rules. 
  
 
Protection Level 
10% 20% 30% 40% 
     
K
n
o
w
le
d
g
e 
L
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Dispersal 
uninformed 
Many Small 0.64/0.82/0.96 0.78/0.95/1.14 0.78/0.93/1.09 0.74/0.94/1.16 
Intermediate 0.92/1.20/1.41 1.63/2.01/2.33 1.34/1.63/1.99 1.39/1.79/2.25 
Few Large 1.67/1.99/2.22 2.26/2.60/2.83 2.13/2.48/2.85 1.71/2.05/2.41 
Informed 
Many Small 0.15/0.36/0.61 0.24/0.54/0.89 0.18/0.35/0.51 0.22/0.43/0.68 
Intermediate 0.18/0.41/0.68 0.31/0.57/0.98 0.17/0.69/1.12 0.24/0.59/0.77 
Few Large 0.35/0.87/1.75 0.36/0.85/1.59 0.68/1.15/1.49 0.94/1.48/2.01 
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Table 1.5 Confidence intervals of abundance variance magnitude 
To quantify differences in variance of recorded abundance in alternate treatment groups, the sample is bootstrapped for the 1st and 
3rd quartile values. Listed are the 95% confidence intervals (lower/median/upper) for the difference between the bootstrapped 1st 
and 3rd quartile values. This difference (75th percentile – 25th percentile) corresponds to the magnitude of the variance in the values 
of adult abundance (millions of fish). Results are highlighted in bold when the 95% CI do not overlap between spacing rules. 
  
 
Protection Level 
10% 20% 30% 40% 
     
K
n
o
w
le
d
g
e 
L
ev
el
 
Dispersal 
uninformed 
Many Small 20.0/22.9/26.1 20.1/24.9/28.7 23.6/29.0/34.3 28.1/32.8/37.2 
Intermediate 26.8/33.3/38.4 50.9/58.6/67.5 50.2/58.7/68.4 61.6/74.3/86.7 
Few Large 45.0/52.4/60.7 59.9/72.5/84.1 72.1/84.2/101 71.8/81.1/90.4 
Informed 
Many Small 6.4/12.4/16.7 4.92/11.6/20.1 6.91/14.0/22.6 6.65/20.3/34.3 
Intermediate 8.3/13.0/18.7 7.95/15.6/30.0 22.8/36.6/49.7 8.87/20.3/34.3 
Few Large 9.6/18.0/29.0 10.1/20.8/37.1 12.4/27.7/50.6 25.9/50.7/77.3 
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Table 1.6 Sensitivity of population model parameters 
To examine how uncertainty in the population dynamics model affects my conclusions, I repeated the entire analysis shifting 
key parameters. Simulations were run under the following scenarios: Beverton-Holt 𝛼 at 50% decrease (0.008) and 50% 
increase (0.024), fishing mortality at 50% decrease (0.035) and 50% increase (0.105). All other parameters were held at original 
values. New results are compared to the key findings from main text highlighted in bold when similar. Most results are not 
qualitatively sensitive to these shifts in parameters. The variance outcomes are most stable result. 
    
 Low Protection Levels High Protection Levels Variance 
 Dispersal 
Uninformed 
Informed Dispersal Uninformed Informed Dispersal 
Uninformed 
Informed 
       
Main Text 
Results 
No Difference 
between Rules 
'Few Large' for 
Fishery Catch 
and Abundance 
'Many Small' for Fishery 
Catch 
Trade-off: 'Many Small' 
for Fishery Catch, 'Few 
Large' for Abundance 
'Many Small' 
lowest 
Little 
Difference 
Alpha 20% 
Increase 
'Many Small' for 
Fishery Catch; 
'Few Large' for 
Abundance 
'Many Small' for Fishery 
Catch 
'Many Small' for Fishery 
Catch; 
'Many Small' 
lowest 
Little 
Difference 
Alpha 20% 
Decrease 
No Difference 
between Rules 
'Few Large' for 
Abundance 
Trade-off: 'Many Small' 
for Fishery Catch, 'Few 
Large' for Abundance 
'Few Large' for 
Abundance 
'Many Small' 
lowest 
Little 
Difference 
Mort 20% 
Increase 
No Difference 
between Rules 
'Few Large' for 
Fishery Catch 
and Abundance 
Trade-off: 'Many Small' 
for Fishery Catch, 'Few 
Large' for Abundance 
Trade-off: 'Many Small' 
for Fishery Catch, 'Few 
Large' for Abundance 
'Many Small' 
lowest 
Little 
Difference 
Mort 20% 
Decrease 
'Many Small' for 
Fishery Catch; 
'Few Large' for 
Fishery Catch 
and Abundance 
'Many Small' for Fishery 
Catch 
Trade-off: 'Many Small' 
for Fishery Catch, 'Few 
Large' for Abundance 
'Many Small' 
lowest 
Little 
Difference 
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Table 1.7 Qualitative results sensitivity to spacing strictness 
I sought to examine the effects of using alternate MPA configuration selection methods. First, the complete analysis was 
repeated using the two methods that increase the strictness of spacing in the MPA siting step. I examined qualitative differences 
between these results and the original main text results (Table 1). Results that remain similar are highlighted in bold. Most 
results are not qualitatively sensitive to these shifts in methods. The variance outcomes are most stable out of any measured 
results. 
 
Latitudinal Binning 
The total area to be protected and the spacing rule (in degree distance) determine the number and size of individual MPAs. The 
entire GBR is then stratified into latitudinal bins. Each bin contains an equal number of reefs, and there are as many bins as 
protected areas to be created. MPAs are then created by drawing a reef randomly from within a bin and building subsequently 
outward, adding nearest reefs until the desired MPA size is achieved.  
 
Even Latitudinal Spacing  
The total area to be protected and the spacing rule (in degree distance) still determine the number and size of individual MPAs. 
However, equidistant latitudinal lines, numbering the same as number of MPAs and spaced at the chosen spacing rule are laid 
across the entire GBR. MPAs are then created by selecting the reef closest to each line and building subsequently outward, 
adding nearest reefs until the desired MPA size is achieved. 
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 Low Protection Levels High Protection Levels Variance 
 Dispersal 
Uninformed 
Informed Dispersal 
Uninformed 
Informed Dispersal 
Uninformed 
Informed 
       
Main Text 
Results 
Little 
Difference 
between 
Rules 
'Few Large' 
for Fishery 
Catch and 
Abundance 
'Many Small' 
for Fishery 
Catch 
Trade-off: 'Many 
Small' for Fishery 
Catch, 'Few Large' 
for Abundance 
'Many Small' 
lowest 
Little 
Difference 
Latitudinal 
Binning 
Little 
Difference 
between 
Rules 
'Few Large' 
for Fishery 
Catch and 
Abundance 
'Many Small' 
for Fishery 
Catch 
'Few Large' for 
Abundance 
'Many Small' 
lowest 
Little 
Difference 
Even 
Latitudinal 
Spacing 
Little 
Difference 
between 
Rules 
'Few Large' 
for Fishery 
Catch and 
Abundance 
'Intermediate' 
for Abundance 
'Few Large' for 
Abundance 
'Many Small' 
lowest 
Little 
Difference 
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Appendix 2: Figures 
 
Figure 1.1 Example MPA network configurations 
SSRs: ‘many small’, ‘intermediate’, ‘few large’ (left to right). Markers indicates a single 
patch reef; black markers denote reefs protected under these example configurations. Inset: 
Reef location along Australian coastline. 
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Figure 1.2 Walk-through of MPA configuration creation and analysis. 
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Figure 1.3 Covariation of A) dispersal uninformed and B) informed configurations.  
The 12 treatment groups are shown (Spacing rules: ‘Many small’, ‘intermediate’, and ‘few 
large’; Proportion protected: 10%, 20%, 30%, and 40%). Each treatment group median is 
plotted with 1st and 3rd quartiles grey lines. A sample of configuration outcomes for the 
‘Many small’/40% treatment group are plotted as grey points.  
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Figure 1.4 Covariation in size and spacing 
Covariation between the size and spacing of protected areas in an MPA configuration. 
MPA configurations protecting 20% of GBR area are shown. Each configuration has a set 
number of equally sized protected areas which have been drawn randomly in regards to 
space. For each configuration, the average size of its protected areas and average space 
between protected areas are determined and plotted as a point. Average spacing is 
determined by drawing a minimum spanning tree across MPAs in the configuration and 
reporting the mean edge distance. This figure demonstrates that in systems in finite space, 
there is inevitably a positive relationship between the size of MPAs and the average 
distance between them. As MPAs become smaller and more numerous, they naturally 
become closer together. 
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Figure 1.5 Covariation in abundance and catch (idealized) 
 Idealized catch-abundance curve for spatially controlled fishery where fishing effort is 
controlled by the total area under protection. This parabolic curve is revealed by varying 
the proportion protected and plotting the steady state for fishery catch versus population 
abundance. No protection leads to fishery collapse, with population and catch at zero. Full 
protection has zero catch with population at carrying capacity. It is easy to interpret the 
peak of the curve as analogous to a Maximum Sustainable Effort from other harvest 
models. To the left of that point is ‘under-protected’, because adding protection would 
increase yield; to the right is ‘over-protected’, because opening more places to fishing 
increases the steady-state yield. This catch-abundance parabola is mirrored by my results 
in Fig. 2 of the main text.  
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Figure 1.6 Covariation in abundance and catch (Realized in model)  
Catch-abundance parabolas are fitted for each size and spacing rule. These parabolas are 
shown here with the main results in Figure 2a and 2b. The parabolas are fitted to the raw 
data (800 configurations for each rule) for both the (A) ‘dispersal uninformed’ and the (B) 
‘informed’ scenario results. The median for results from each spacing rule and protection 
level are also plotted. By tracking the peak of the parabolas across different size and 
spacing rules, it is clear that dimensions change. Most notably, the peak shifts to the left as 
rule goes from ‘many small’ to ‘few large’ although this pattern is diminished in the 
‘informed’ scenario.  
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Figure 1.7 Near optimal performance trajectory 
Relationship between sampling intensity of MPA configurations and best observed 
performance among sample. Circles are interpreted as the average performance level of the 
best performing configuration if N number of configurations were analyzed. Colors 
represent different protection levels (White is 10% coverage of the GBR, Light grey 20%, 
Dark grey 30%, and Black 40%). To demonstrate how performance approaches optimal, I 
created 2000 configurations for each treatment group from the main analysis. For each 
sampling size (N), I draw N number of configurations from the pool of 2000, then identify 
the best performance observed in that sample. I repeat this 1000 times for a particular 
sampling size and plot the median of the best outcomes observed across the 1000 samples. 
When considering the performance of near-optimal solutions, the choice of performance 
metrics matters greatly. Here, the key performance metrics are the estimated catch 
available and the estimated biomass that can be supported. Importantly, as alternative MPA 
sets meeting a given SSR are evaluated, aggregate performance metrics like these may 
converge quickly, even though the particular spatial locations being chosen to protect 
continue to change. In other words, the surface traced by relevant performance metrics may 
flatten out as the optimal solution is approached. Indeed, I observe exactly this type of 
dynamic with the model and the diminishing returns in the performance metrics with larger 
sampling are easily observed. By the time the sampling size gets to 200 (my sample size in 
the main analysis) the best configurations are similar to more intensive sampling groups. 
So I define the “dispersal informed” set in my main analysis as the top ten percent of 
configurations in terms of the win-win performance metric (combined metric described in 
the main text). Given the diminished returns in increasing sampling across the 
configuration state space, I acknowledge these as near optimal.  
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Figure 1.7 Continued  
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Figure 1.8 Comparative spacing rules 
Covariation of ‘dispersal uninformed’ configurations across 5 spacing rules. The 12 
treatment groups described earlier are shown (Spacing rules: ‘Many small’, ‘intermediate’, 
and ‘few large’; Proportion protected: 10%, 20%, 30%, and 40%). The median for each 
treatment group is plotted. Additional spacing rules ‘average dispersal distance’ and 
‘bioregional spacing’ median performances are plotted across the four protection levels 
(10%, 20%, 30%, 40%). Two further spacing rules grounded in recommendations are 
presented in comparison with the main results. I report median values of these other spacing 
rules across the four protection levels (Tables S7 & S8) and qualitatively compare their 
outcomes to my original rules  
1) ‘Average dispersal distance’ is configured under the same methodology as main 
SSRs with average spacing of 110km, an estimated median dispersal distance of 
the study species from the dispersal model.  
2) ‘Bioregional spacing’ is creating by choosing a starting point at random in each of 
31 bioregions, then building out a single MPA composing 10%, 20%, 30% or 40% 
of the bioregions total area depending on treatment group. 
As summarized in the Discussion, the behavior of the ‘average dispersal distance’ rule falls 
somewhere between the many small and intermediate SSRs I illustrated. With the added 
data of bioregional definitions, the ‘bioregional spacing’ performs better than or equal to 
the SSRs I focused on for fishery catch and almost as well as the ‘few large’ SSR for 
maintaining fish abundance. 
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Figure 1.8 Continued 
  
58 
 
CHAPTER 2 
FINANCIAL COSTS OF LAND CONESRVATION  
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A version of this chapter is being formatted for submission for publication by R. Fovargue, 
J. Fargione, M. Garrison and P. Armsworth: 
 Fovargue, RE, J Fargione, M Garrison, PA Armsworth. "Financial Costs of Land 
Conservation”. Conservation Biology.  
 
MG & JF supplied key data sets and input into analysis. RF & PA both contributed to the 
study design, and data interpretation, as well as revisions to the text. RF was primarily 
responsible for data compilation and analysis and initial drafts of the manuscript. 
 
Abstract 
New land protection is expensive and the mismatch through time between 
opportunities for acquisition and income emphasize the importance of flexible means of 
purchase. This makes the use of loans a critical tool for conservation, but one rarely 
discussed in the conservation planning literature. I take a first step toward quantifying this 
behavior by analyzing the performance of a set of loans supporting land protection through 
an internal revolving fund at a large US conservation nonprofit. I estimate loan financing 
cost through accrued interest and propensity of default. I then test deal-level characteristics 
for explanatory power of these metrics. I demonstrate that loan performance can be highly 
uncertain, that costs can be substantial in relation to the total purchase price, and provide 
examples of how this may impact prioritization. 
 
Introduction 
Land protection is a critical tool for of conserving biodiversity. Land trusts play a growing 
role in establishing new conservation lands, often acquiring lands directly, creating 
easements or facilitating public agencies in taking ownership of new protected areas by 
serving as temporary land holders (Merenlender et al. 2004; Chang 2016). Unfortunately, 
conservation is chronically underfunded (Shaffer, Scott & Casey 2002; McCarthy et al. 
2012) and new land purchases are increasingly more expensive, even after accounting for 
inflation trends (Davies, Kareiva & Armsworth 2010). This funding deficiency is 
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accentuated in situations where a large investment is needed quickly, as is often the case 
when a property comes on the land market for a short window. If this timing does not 
coincide with grants or fundraising seasons, then an organization may be caught 
shorthanded. Preparing for such moments is critical for efficient decisions and action 
(McDonald-Madden et al. 2008). As a result, many land trusts turn to financing options to 
supply the quick cash infusion that many conservation opportunities need. Taking a loan 
helps to grant flexibility in paying for a property over time with future income or allow 
time for a partner organization to prepare to take on the property. 
 
From planning to acquisition and management, land protection is a complicated process 
that involves uncertainty and careful strategy (Groves & Game 2016). To inform the 
decisions made by conservation organizations, it is vital that, as a literature, conservation 
biology recognizes the practical constructs that these organizations work within. Use of 
loans as an enabling tool for land acquisition is one area that has been rarely mentioned in 
the conservation science literature (but see Bos, Pressey & Stoeckl 2015; Ando & Shah 
2016; Lennox et al. 2016). Yet over 50% of land trusts report in a survey conducted by 
The Conservation Fund as having used financing to assist in purchases (pers comm. 
Amundsen). Not only do traditional loaning agencies, such as banks, provide lending 
opportunities to conservation groups, but many national and regional conservation 
organizations manage revolving funds to use explicitly for conservation (Clark 2007). 
Some, such as The Conservation Fund, the Open Space Institute, and the Maine Coast 
Heritage Trust, provide external loans (Clark 2007). Other organizations manage internal 
revolving funds to provide a temporary funding source for their own projects, such as The 
Nature Conservancy’s Land Preservation Fund (Birchard 2005). Though my discussion 
focuses on U.S organizations, loans for conservation work are seen internationally as a 
valuable instrument (Keipi 1995; Lennox et al. 2016). In this paper, I concentrate on 
internal revolving loan funds as an example of conservation lending. However, lending 
programs for habitat conservation are being explored through many mechanisms. For 
example, a recent interest in conservation has arisen in the impact investment sector. There, 
individuals and private groups provide loans for habitat conservation with expectation of a 
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small monetary return supplemented by social benefits (Hamrick 2016). I will return to this 
in the discussion. 
 
Loans are critical as an enabling mechanism to allow for quick action by land protection 
organizations. In addition to relieving the money-in-hand constraint on conservation 
action, financing can permit small land trusts to dream bigger. Large-scale reserves which 
minimize fragmentation and reduce edge effects not only have important ecological 
benefits (Woodroffe 1998; Peres 2005), but also present cost efficiencies with economies 
of scale demonstrated across both acquisition and management costs (Armsworth et al. 
2011; Kim et al. 2014). Loan financing allows for these larger, often more complicated 
plans involving multiple partnerships, to be realized. As land purchases become more 
expensive, financing to allow bigger projects also becomes more critical. It has been 
demonstrated that there are particular moments in which a timely allocation of funds can 
allow for efficient conservation gains (Radeloff et al. 2013; Larson, Boyer & Armsworth 
2014). Loans allow for this timely investment, and in the case of revolving funds, further 
allow a single dollar for conservation to be leveraged across many projects by repeat 
lending through time. 
 
Although providing flexibility to organizations to have greater choice about and ability to 
pursue potential conservation acquisitions, loans incur added financial cost in terms of 
interest payments over time. Commitment to debt repayment also incurs an implicit 
opportunity cost to the borrower because other conservation opportunities may need to be 
passed over during the repayment period. These drawbacks are both part of a cost benefit 
trade-off that a land trust considers when financing new projects. There is a further risk of 
the inability to repay a loan in a timely manner, which impacts both the loaning institute 
with lower-than-expected returns and the borrower with a potential loss of collateral. 
Furthermore, both borrowing and lending organizations can become overextended with 
funds tied to a project that goes long in repayment, which subsequently grows the 
opportunity cost of the loan decision beyond expected levels. There are many possible 
circumstances which may cause a loan to be slow to repay. Perhaps a planned resell or 
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transfer of the property falls through, a fundraising campaign does not bring in as much 
capital as expected, or external circumstances, such as a market crash lowers income to the 
organization and the value of the property. 
 
An accurate projection of costs and risk is critical for evaluating trade-offs faced by 
conservation practitioners. To better explore loans as a major funding mechanism for 
conservation, I take a first step toward evaluating cost and risk of conservation loans and 
identifying potential project correlates of each. I track land acquisition deals from proposal 
to repayment within a case study comprising a large land trust with an internal loan fund.  
 
I first aim to investigate how loans impact the cost incurred by a borrowing organization 
and how this cost may influence decision-making, particularly the prioritization of land 
deals or the decision to pursue a particular land deal. Specifically, I ask whether known 
characteristics of a proposed deal or a borrower explain variation in interest accrued over 
the lifetime of the loan, how interest correlates with the purchase price of a deal, and 
whether including interest costs changes prioritization rankings of proposed deals.  
 
Next, I consider how loaning organizations, often themselves conservation non-profits, 
may view these loans and risk they might impart. Specifically, I provide information about 
what proportion of loans in the dataset were not repaid by the expected date and how much 
extra time and interest was needed to repay fully. I also ask whether there are characteristics 
of a deal that explain variation in organizations’ propensity to miss the proposed repayment 
date, or amount of unanticipated interest accrued. 
 
Methods 
I use a set of historical land acquisition deals to examine interest accumulation and 
repayment time on loans for land purchases. 
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Data 
I use records of land acquisition deals by The Nature Conservancy (TNC), which provides 
internal financing opportunities for state chapters through the Land Preservation Fund 
(LPF). The LPF was first established in 1979 as a $20 million internal revolving fund, and 
has since grown significantly (Birchard 2005; Clark 2007). Inside the United States, TNC 
is structured with state chapters that perform much of the on-the-ground conservation work. 
The LPF, managed at the TNC national headquarters, provides bridge loans to chapters 
pursing large land acquisition projects. The use of a case study of a single organization 
allows me to track projects from proposal stages through loan repayment within the same 
record-keeping and organizational structure. I extract characteristics of the deal and 
financial plans from a set of land deals acquired between the years 2000-2011. This decade 
witnessed a variety of economic conditions, including two recessions followed by periods 
of economic expansion. In fact, the LPF interest rates tracked these external market 
conditions, with peak annual interest rates coinciding with high points in United States 
prime rate (years 2001, 2007, 2008). Therefore, this time period should encapsulate a 
variety of behaviors for pursuing loans.  
 
Projects selected for the analysis all had purchase prices of at least $1,000,000 and both 
requested and received a loan account from the LPF. TNC was active throughout this time 
period, with over a thousand large land deals being approved by the board over the 12 
years. Further, I use only projects where I was confident that a single financial transaction 
could unambiguously be associated with an individual land deal (and so excluding, for 
example, instances in which a single loan was used to fund a growing set of land 
acquisitions through time). This selection method censors the dataset in several ways, 
mainly by excluding land acquisition deals less than $1,000,000 (these did not require the 
same proposal process, but also likely were in less need of loan financing) and deals that 
sought outside financing options or did not need financing. By focusing on expensive deals 
that required internal financing, the selection pool may have a higher propensity for poor 
loan performance. Contrarily, the dataset is also leaves out deals whose proposed plan 
sufficiently changed so as not be recognizable in both data sets. These unstable plans may 
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have been of higher risk for loan performance and by censoring these deals, may leave a 
more conservative group of deals for the analysis. 
 
After matching across data sources, a subset of 181 deals was identified across 24 state 
chapters (median of 6 loans per state). I extracted characteristics from these deals manually 
from internal TNC documents that explain why the acquisition was being pursued and 
provide details for likely funding scenarios (deal characteristics, Table 1). I estimated loan 
performance metrics from matched accounts (Figure S1). Start date was the observed 
purchase date in the loan account and repayment date was defined as the first date in which 
the remaining loan balance fell below 0.1% of the purchase price. Interest accrued for the 
loan was subsequently defined by any interest charges between these dates. All monetary 
values are reported in 2010 USD (translated using Consumer Price Index from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics). 
 
Describing Loans 
I first examine descriptive statistics of loan characteristics both as they were projected at 
the time of proposal and as they were realized over the time to repayment. Along with this, 
I address the simple question: does a bigger loan lead to more interest? I estimate a rank 
correlation for the interest and purchase price of a deal both in the predicted and realized 
form. This allows me to assess the linkage between interest and price in both the planning 
stage and implementation stage of a land acquisition deal.  
 
Generalized Linear Mixed Models 
I create generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs) to explain loan performance using 
information that a decision-maker would know ahead of time. Given the sample size 
(N=181), to prevent overfitting (Harrell 2015) I limit the number of parameters to 9 fixed 
effects and one random effect chosen a priori as the most likely to influence loan 
performance, identified through conversations with practitioners (pers comm. Hall & 
Amundsen). Specific hypotheses focus on project characteristics such as future land use 
plans or funds dedicated to the purchase. I also hypothesize that projects with established 
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take-out plans, meaning a strategy in place to resell or transfer the property to a partner 
organization, are less risky and would accrue less interest. Furthermore, I hypothesize that 
some characteristics of the borrowing chapter, like average expenditure and income, will 
also correlate to better loan performance. Additional explanations of a priori hypotheses 
are given in Table 1. Collinearity of predictors was checked using variance inflation factors 
and fell within tolerated ranges. 
 
First, I look to explain total interest accrued. Given the skewed distribution of interest and 
presence of zeros, I transformed the raw interest values for use with a Gaussian family 
(log(TotalInterest+1)). Second, I use a binary variable to indicate whether the loan missed 
the estimated date of repayment. Third, to take a more nuanced perspective of late 
repayment, I look at differences between predicted and realized interest. This disparity 
represents the unanticipated costs of the loan, including additional opportunity costs.  
 
Impact on Prioritization 
I tested the impact of loan costs on a return-on-investment framework prioritization using 
this set of TNC deals. Consideration of loan financing costs within this context may change 
prioritizations if loan costs are large and not correlated to purchase prices or the other 
upfront costs more traditionally used for ROI analyses (Boyd, Epanchin-Niell & Siikamäki 
2015). I compared rankings of the full set of deals, the first prioritization using only 
purchase price and the second using purchase price and financial costs (estimated interest). 
I ranked all projects based on dollar per hectare protected. I report differences between the 
rankings with and without financial costs by estimating Spearman’s Rank Correlation 
Coefficient.  
 
Results 
Loan Performance 
Land acquisitions in the dataset ranged from 2010 USD $1 million to 2010 USD $76 
million and were strongly right skewed with three quarters of purchase prices falling under 
2010 USD $5 million. Most projects protected forested habitat. The median project area 
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was 330 hectares. At the time of writing the project proposal documents, the average 
acquisition had 7% of the purchase price either in hand or pledged to the project. Some 
pledged funds covered the full cost of the project, which, if realized, allowed for a quick 
repayment. About 57% of projects had a take-out plan to resell or transfer the acquired 
parcel to another agency or organization. Over half of the take-out plans in place at the 
time of proposal writing were with state government partner organizations.  
 
Across all projects, the median interest accrued per loan was $104,136. When comparing 
accrued interest to the interest predicted by the project proposal documents, only 16% of 
loans paid more interest than anticipated; nonetheless, these loans that underestimated 
interest accumulated on average an additional $163,000. We find that the predicted interest 
is often estimated with a fixed rate based on the rate offered that fiscal year, but that the 
loans experience an annually adjusting rate. Because of this uncertainty, many of the 
proposals show a ‘worst case scenario’ interest estimate where the full principal remains 
unpaid for the life of the loan. This behavior helps to explain the frequent over prediction 
observed. On the opposite end of the spectrum, 17% of projects accrued no interest. These 
projects either had pledged funding, grants that came in quickly, or a take-out plan 
completed within the first month of the loan (sometimes in as little as 24 hours), so no 
interest payments occurred. On average, interest compromised about 5% of the purchase 
price, but the range was large, and the dataset included situations where loans amassed 
interest equivalent in value of up to 40% of the purchase price. 
 
The median time to repayment was a year and a half, with some loans taking up to 8 years. 
47% of loans missed their repayment date, and those repaying late took an additional 1.5 
years on average. With longer loans, the interest rate experienced fluctuated prior to 
repayment. Interest rates for the LPF are set annually and varied between 4% and 7% 
annual interest within the time frame of this data set. 
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Purchase Price and Interest 
A significant positive correlation between purchase price and interest across predicted and 
realized circumstances demonstrates that larger deals do bear a higher financial cost (Fig. 
1). However, the correlation between the predicted purchase price and predicted interest is 
much higher than that between realized purchase and realized interest. When moving from 
the expected outcomes to realized outcomes, many occurrences may alter repayment 
schedule to explain this pattern. First, the principal of the loan may be lower than purchase 
price due to assistance from partners or funds in hand lowering the charge observed in the 
loan account. Interest accrued can be substantially lower than expected (sometimes zero) 
due to take-out plans or other funding materializing faster than expected. In contrast, 
interest may be higher than anticipated when funding plans fall through. The decreased 
goodness of fit in the realized scenario illustrates the decoupling of financial costs with 
purchase price as potential realities transpire. This variation highlights the importance of 
understanding determinants of loan performance. 
 
GLMM 
To determine correlates of loan performance, we tested the significance of predictors in a 
GLMM framework (Table 2.2). In the model explaining total interest accrued by a loan, a 
small number of variables show significant explanatory power. Purchase price is positively 
correlated with total interest accrued. Funds in-hand and pledged are both negatively 
correlated with total interest. These predictors are all indicative of the initial principal for 
the loan and so intuitively support these correlations with accrued interest. In addition, 
deals that have planned recreational use are less likely to accrue large amounts of interest. 
I also find that including state as a random effect produces a significant improvement of 
the model, showing a conditional R-squared value of 0.43 as compared to the marginal R-
squared value of 0.18. This improvement indicates that there may be unexplained variation 
among state chapters that impacts loan performance. This difference among state chapters 
persists beyond the characteristics of TNC state chapters for which I already control, 
including average expenditure and income.  
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In the model explaining missed repayment deadlines, no variables show significance and 
little variation is explained (R-squared .10). In the model predicting unanticipated interest, 
only a single variable, state chapter expenditure, shows a slight negative correlation. This 
may indicate that a history of land acquisition projects and experience helps to lower the 
likelihood of unanticipated interest. Still, little variation in this performance metric is 
explained by the model (R-squared .03). 
 
Prioritization 
The two alternate priority rankings, with and without interest costs, are highly similar with 
Spearman ρ value of .99. Though there were no large movements within the rankings, 75% 
of projects changed their ranking placement. On average, deals shifted up or down in rank 
by 2 spots. This demonstrates that financial costs are large enough to change the ranking 
of projects in an ROI framework and had TNC not had the funding to support all of these 
projects, likely would have impacted the "marginal deal" chosen for protection. This 
remains true with use of either predicted or realized interest amounts.  
 
Discussion 
In this paper, I analyzed land acquisition deals financed through a major land trust’s 
internal revolving fund to take an important first step in evaluating costs and risks of loans 
for conservation action. I show that costs associated with loan financing can be substantial 
in size, adding up to 40% of the purchase price to the total investment on the project in 
extreme cases. I also show that more expensive projects give rise to higher loan costs. 
Borrowing also carries an opportunity cost that may grow with time to repayment. 
 
There is a clear benefit to the act of borrowing to enable purchase of a targeted parcel, 
namely that the land is protected and not developed; however, monetary resources may be 
unavailable to an organization or the lending agency to pursue other projects that crop up 
in the interim. If a loan drags out past an anticipated repayment, as almost half of the loans 
do in my dataset, this inflicts an unanticipated opportunity cost on the borrower and lender.  
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The dataset analyzed here demonstrates a relatively high rate of loans extending beyond 
their predicted repayment date. Nevertheless, loans tended to overpredict their total interest 
payments. This may indicate a poor ability to accurately predict financial outcomes, or a 
low level of discipline in maintaining strict repayment schedules. 
 
Here I have limited my analysis to an internal revolving loan fund. While this helps to 
provide consistency across the dataset, this may limit my ability to generalize my results 
to external lending scenarios. Conversations with practitioners and writings on the subject 
indicate that loans for conservation from external organizations exhibit very low default 
rates (Clark 2007, & pers comm: Amundsen). This may indicate a higher aversion to risk 
of default under an external loan structure, and likewise my study may show that internal 
loans provide more cushioning and flexibility regarding loan repayment. This flexibility in 
turn may provide a structure under which other preferences are revealed. For instance, with 
less danger of penalties for poor loan performance, the financial costs of taking on debt 
may better reflect perceived opportunity costs. Estimations, such as this, may inform 
broader conservation planning and decisions by other land trusts. 
 
In addition to showing that loans deviate from expected repayment paths, I find that it is 
difficult to predict which loans will deviate in terms of late repayment or unanticipated 
costs. Though total interest accrued is highly correlated to the purchase price and funds 
already dedicated to the project, variation in these other loan performance metrics was not 
explained well by characteristics of the deal itself nor by the borrowing chapter. I also 
performed sensitivity tests by adding other factors into this basic model, including habitat 
type protected, partner organization type, and a recession year dummy indicator. None of 
these inclusions improved significantly upon the performance of the model presented in 
the main text. 
 
Part of the fixed risk of loan-taking is the potential for the inability to repay along the 
expected repayment path. This risk should be mitigated with the assignment of an 
appropriate interest rate. In my analysis, the inability to predict deviations from the planned 
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repayment paths suggests that the risk is evenly distributed across loans of varying 
characteristics. For an organization like TNC to conduct financial planning, it needs to be 
able to project in-flows and out-flows associated with these loans. That is made more 
difficult if state chapters often break with their repayment plans. The departure from 
repayment expectations may indicate that the incentive structures are not set up correctly, 
meaning interest rates may be too low or penalties may need to aid enforcement of 
repayment schedules. 
 
As mentioned earlier, a major caveat of this study is the limited scope of focusing on 
internal revolving funds. The establishment of internal revolving funds is growing in 
popularity in the land trust community, although may not be feasible for the smallest land 
trusts. Conservation loans are offered across many different organization types and 
extension work to investigate costs, risks and benefits of other loan structures is crucial to 
furthering our understanding of this topic. Similar models of financing for conservation are 
being replicated in other sectors. Financing is combined with philanthropy in Impact 
Investing, where a gift is offered by a loaning entity that absorbs more risk with a lower 
expected return (Hamrick 2016). Similarly, financing conservation through Program 
Related Investments as a form of mission-oriented work is also growing in interest among 
foundations and other organizations managing large endowments.  
 
An additional topic for extension work is the study of risk preferences of conservation non-
profits through their pursuit of financing options. Although loans are a great tool for 
capacity building, they also change the financial structure of an organization (Bowman 
2002). We should consider that the optimal debt to equity ratio may be lower in non-profits 
than for profit organizations (Bowman 2015). This may be reflective of a lower financial 
security, though conservation has been shown to be resilient through recessions (Larson 
2014). Instead, this may demonstrate a risk preference of non-profits. This risk preference 
may also appear in choice of collateral for loans. Most land acquisition projects are 
reluctant to offer the property itself as collateral due to the motivation to conserve that 
property in its current state and unwillingness to see it developed. This adds an additional 
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challenge for conservation organizations to find adequate collateral or letter of guarantee 
to securing external loan with low interest rates (Clark 2007).  
 
Utilizing loans as a tool for financing conservation land acquisition is a widespread practice 
and critical to expanding capacity of non-profit land trust organizations. It is important to 
understand the inherent costs and risks associated with this mechanism as well as particular 
aspects of projects that predict these costs for the lending and borrowing organizations. I 
demonstrate the potential magnitude of loan-associated costs, but identify few 
characteristics that explain variation in loan performance. I believe further research, 
collaboration, and education can help expand the effective use of loans as a beneficial tool 
in land acquisition.   
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Appendix 1: Tables 
Table 2.1 Predictor variables 
Hypothesized correlations with propensity to default and interest accumulation as well as 
summary statistics of deal and state chapter characteristics 
 
 Predictor H Unit Rationale Data Summary 
 
D
ea
l 
C
h
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
 
Purchase price (+) Dollars 
More expensive projects 
may be more difficult to 
repay 
Min: 1 million 
Median: 2.4 million 
Max: 76 million 
Funds in hand  (-) 
% of 
purchase 
price  
Available funding is a 
factor actively used to 
assess loan applications. 
Funds in-hand and pledged 
are hypothesized by land 
trust contacts to be the 
factors of highest 
explanatory power (pers. 
comm: Hall & 
Amundsen).  
Min: 0% 
Mean: 5% 
Max: 100% 
Funds pledged  (-) 
% of 
purchase 
price  
Min: 0% 
Mean: 3% 
Max: 200% 
Human land 
use, 
Recreational  
(-) 1/0 
These variables might be 
indicative of future 
revenue sources or outside 
interest in funding for a 
deal. 
46% of deals  
Human land 
use, Extractive 
(-) 1/0 29% of deals 
Number of 
partner 
organizations  
(-) count 
A large number of 
involved partners may 
buffer the uncertainty in 
financing or may be 
indicative of a long 
running or complex deal, 
either of which may help 
to ensure timely 
repayment.  
Min: 0 
Median: 4 
Max: 11 
Take-out plan  (-) 1/0 
Take-out plans would 
indicate a large source of 
planned revenue a deal and 
therefore may decrease the 
likelihood of late 
repayment.  
57% of deals had 
take-out 
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Table 2.1 Continued 
  
 
 Predictor H Unit Rationale Data Summary 
 
S
ta
te
 
State 
experience 
(-) 
Total chapter 
expenditure 
2000-2009 
(dollars) 
More experienced 
borrowers may have 
better loan 
performance. 
Min: 30 million 
Median: 106 million 
Max: 489 million 
State 
fundraising 
(-) 
Total chapter 
fundraising 
2000-2009 
(dollars) 
Higher regular 
income is associated 
with a lower risk 
borrower 
Min: 14 million 
Median: 48 million 
Max: 138 million  
Random 
effect, 
State 
 categorical 
Larson et al. shows 
some patterns that 
certain state chapters 
behave differently in 
terms of fundraising 
before or after deals. 
This indicates that 
state chapter culture 
may play a factor in 
financial strategies, 
and subsequently 
loan performance.  
24 states; Median 6 
loans per state 
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Table 2.2 Loan performance metrics  
 
Loan 
Response 
Variable 
Definition Data Summary  Implications 
 
Total 
Interest 
Accrued 
Interest between 
start date and 
repayment date 
Min: $ 0 
Median: $104,136 
Max: $ 12 million 
17% of deals accrued 
no interest 
Traits associated with 
greater interest, have 
higher overall costs. These 
traits should thus be 
carefully considered in the 
costs assessment phase of 
deal planning.  
Amount of 
Unpredicted 
Interest 
Total Interest - 
Predicted Interest  
16% of deals under-
predicted interest; of 
those, median 
additional interest 
accrued was $163,000 
If traits show a 
relationship with missed 
predictions, then these 
traits may be associated 
with higher or lower risk 
and should be considered 
in a screening process. 
Deals with high risk 
correlates may have 
augmented interest or 
some other contractual 
obligation. If no traits, 
including state chapter, 
shows a relationship, then 
risk of deviation has been 
spread evenly across deals 
indicating that all chapters 
and deals should be 
subject to the same rules.  
Missed 
Predicted 
Repayment 
Date 
Binary variable 
(1/0); Observed 
versus predicted 
repayment date 
47% late; of those, 
median additional 
time was 1.5 years to 
repay 
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Table 2.3 Generalized linear mixed model results  
(significance levels: ‘.’ 0.1; ‘*’ 0.05; ‘***’ 0.0001) 
    
 Total Interest Missed Repayment 
Unpredicted 
Interest 
Predictor Estimate SD  Estimate SD  Estimate SD  
   
log Purchase 
Price 
1.538 0.356 *** -0.108 0.183  0.0003 
0.0
10 
 
% of Price In 
Hand 
-4.997 2.007 * -0.849 1.044  0.018 
0.0
57 
 
% of Price 
Pledged 
-1.732 0.790 * -0.155 0.416  0.005 
0.0
23 
 
Take-out 
Plan 
-0.125 0.656  -0.167 0.334  -0.014 
0.0
18 
 
Total 
Number of 
Partner 
-0.056 0.152  -0.043 0.082  0.001 
0.0
04 
 
Land Use, 
Recreational 
-1.740 0.848 * -0.704 0.444  0.001 
0.0
24 
 
Land Use, 
Extraction 
-0.062 0.859  0.227 0.464  -0.022 
0.0
25 
 
State 
Expenditure 
-0.002 0.007  -0.002 0.002  -0.0002 
0.0
001 
. 
State 
Fundraising 
-0.026 0.027  -0.001 0.008  0.0004 
0.0
004 
 
Random 
Effect, State 
Var: 
6.283 
2.507  
Var:  
0.000 
0.000  
Var:  
0.114 
0.3
38 
 
 
Marginal R-sq:  
0.177  
Conditional R-sq:  
0.429 
Marginal R-sq: 
0.07373  
Conditional R-sqd: 
0.105 
Marginal R-sq:  
0.0355  
Conditional R-
sq: 0.0355 
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Table 2.4 Matching criteria for land acquisition deals.  
To match a single project across TNC datasets (proposals and loan accounts) multiple 
criteria were used. All four criteria must be met for a positive match. In rare occurrences, 
an exact match could be made with an account number listed in the abstract. This instance 
outweighs a lack of other matching criteria.  
  
Characteristic Match Criteria 
  
State Name Exact name match 
Property Name Partial name match 
Purchase Amount Purchase observed in account must be within 
20% of purchase price stated in proposal 
Purchase Date Date of observed purchase in account must be 
within 3 months of potential closing date listed in 
abstract 
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Appendix 2: Figures 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Correlation between purchase price and interest.  
Left panel: predicted values; Right panel: realized values. Both predicted and realized 
before and after pictures show significant correlations (p << 0.01), but demonstrate that 
reality rarely follows predictions and the correlation becomes uncoupled as chance events 
add variance to the system.  
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Figure 2.2 Example time series of cost centers for one TNC deal.  
Blue line marks the estimated repayment date. Realized repayment days is marked when 
account regains a near-zero balance (defined as 0.1% of the purchase price).  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE LANSCAPE OF CONSERVATION FUNRAISING 
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A version of this chapter was submitted for publication by R. Fovargue, J. Harris, M. 
Fisher, and P. Armsworth: 
 Fovargue, RE, M Fisher, J Harris, PA Armsworth. "The Landscape of 
Conservation Philanthropy”. Conservation Letters.  
 
MF & JH produced key data sets, provided input into analysis, and helped with final 
revisions of the manuscript. RF & PA both contributed to the study design, data analysis 
and interpretation, as well as revision of the article. RF was primarily responsible for data 
compilation and analysis and writing first drafts of the article. 
 
Abstract 
Finding ways to increase financial support is critical to conservation efforts. I use 
conservation fundraising data that are unprecedented in their resolution to reveal spatial 
patterns in philanthropic giving. These data describe giving to a major land protection 
organization in the US. I can explain around 40% of the variation in the propensity to give 
and overall value of gifts based on sociodemographic and other predictors. For example, 
education level has greater predictive capacity than income, political views and other 
factors often considered important. I also quantify the relationship between the amount of 
effort devoted to fund-raising and donations received. I illustrate how a conservation 
organization could use my approach to inform efforts aimed at increasing philanthropic 
giving and provide an example that, if followed, offers a potential increase of almost 40% 
or USD $200 million in fundraising revenue for the focal conservation organization. 
 
Introduction 
Private conservation organizations play a critical role in conserving new protected areas. 
In the U.S. alone, private land trusts have protected over 23 million hectares by buying 
land or establishing easements (Chang 2016). But land protection is expensive (Davies et 
al. 2010) and funding for conservation often falls far short of what is needed to achieve 
protection goals (Bruner et al. 2001; Merenlender et al. 2004; McCarthy et al. 2012) By 
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better understanding philanthropic giving to conservation, organizations may be able to 
identify ways to increase funding support, allowing more on-the-ground conservation to 
proceed. 
 
Philanthropic gifts constitute a vital source of funding for conservation (Clark 2007). Gifts 
typically make up 50-95% of revenue to U.S. land trusts, my focus in this study (Guidestar 
2016). Spatial gradients in conservation philanthropy appear pronounced but have only 
been coarsely described (e.g. state level - Larson et al. 2016, country level – Halpern et al. 
2006) greatly limiting inference about what predicts giving. Despite the obvious link 
between funding and on-the-ground actions, the conservation literature has largely focused 
on where to invest available funds and largely ignored where those funds originate (Withey 
et al. 2012; Groves & Game 2016). Some information about giving is available from non-
spatial stated preference studies (Pate & Loomis 1997; Yen et al. 1997; Greenspan et al. 
2012), but no previous work has examined large-scale, finely resolved patterns of realized 
giving to conservation organizations.  
 
Understanding the landscape of donations is important for two reasons. First, 
understanding correlates of propensity to donate allows for improved spatial targeting of 
fundraising efforts, potentially increasing resources for additional conservation. 
Fundraising requires a substantial investment of staff time and other resources. Thus, the 
fundraiser’s problem is conceptually identical to a conservation planning problem where 
limited funds for conservation concentrate actions on places of highest return (Margules & 
Pressey 2000; Withey et al 2012). These two optimization problems are connected through 
the conservation budget which can be augmented by strategic fundraising and subsequently 
expands the set of possible conservation actions through a relaxed budget constraint. 
Effectively directing fundraising effort to locations that promise the greatest return in terms 
of future giving is therefore important.  Second, conservation actions can be constrained 
by funding origin because many gifts are restricted to be spent on particular regions or 
projects (Ando & Shah 2010; Larson et al. 2016). Accounting for these funding constraints 
is an important step in the implementation of proposed conservation plans (Carter et al. 
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2014). Identifying the landscape of conservation fundraising would help define the impact 
of this constraint.  
 
In this paper, I identify how sociodemographic and other characteristics of an area explain 
observed giving patterns to a large U.S. land trust. Based on writings on general giving 
patterns to nonprofits I identify candidate predictor variables that may explain variation in 
giving to conservation among US ZIP codes. I first identify what predicts whether a ZIP 
code has provided at least one donation. Then, conditional on a gift having been made, I 
identify what explains variation in the overall financial value of gifts. With my novel 
dataset, I provide an unrivalled picture of spatial variation in private conservation donations 
and highlight the benefits of strategic fundraising behavior to maximize future giving. 
 
Methods 
Case Study 
I focus on patterns of giving from inside the contiguous US to The Nature Conservancy 
(TNC), a private land trust. TNC has a 60-year history of land preservation and currently 
earns over $500 million in annual contributions (Birchard 2005; Guidestar 2016). TNC 
provided data on giving to the organization from donors that they class as “middle tier 
donors”; these are individuals who have given annually between $1000 and $100,000 to 
the organization. To maintain sufficient anonymity, I am not able to include gifts from the 
largest donors. While acknowledging that these top donations are important to fundraising 
for extensive non-profits, the range in size of middle tier gifts readily encompasses the 
largest donors to some smaller land trusts. Further, this sampling group allows for adequate 
coverage on a national scale to permit rich statistical analyses and spans important axes of 
variation in factors potentially associated with giving under scope of this paper. So, 
although I use a censored giving dataset, this rare access to real philanthropy data is a 
significant first step in quantifying spatial patterns of conservation giving. TNC provided 
donation data for 5 post-recession years (2009-2014). Donations are spatially aggregated 
to Zip Code Tabulation Areas - referred to throughout as ZIP codes - defined by the 2010 
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census (see Supplemental Materials 1 for more details on this spatial unit). ZIP codes 
contain on average 3000 residents.  
 
Data 
I identified a list of potential predictors of giving based on conversations with land trust 
practitioners and ideas drawn from general nonprofit writings. Prior studies suggest 
determinants of philanthropy can be grouped into several categories: the ability of an 
individual to donate money, an awareness of the organization, and a value set that aligns 
with the cause (Sargeant 1999; Bekkers & Wiepking 2011). I identify demographic factors 
at a ZIP code level that align with these suggested determinants of giving.  
 
First, age and income have been identified as factors that increase ability to donate. Wealth 
provides potential for larger gifts and older individuals have been shown to give more than 
younger counterparts (Mount 1996). Consequently, I include percent of population of 
retirement age, median income and percent of households in poverty as predictors in my 
study. 
 
Second, awareness of an organization may be estimated through fundraising intensity in an 
area or by geographic closeness to organizational activities – in this case nearness to 
protected lands. These factors are represented in my model by fundraising effort and 
amount of protected land within a day-trip distance of the ZIP code (Cordell et al. 2013). 
Communication intensity and style is important to donors (Sargeant et al. 2006), so TNC 
provided a history of contact instances (calls, letters, emails) for a large portion of donors 
in the data set. This list was aggregated to ZIP code to allow me to account for this 
important interaction. 
 
Third, several demographics describe tendencies toward pro-environmental values. Studies 
show that higher educational level and left-leaning political beliefs may influence an 
individual’s inclination to support a conservation organization through giving of money or 
time (Ryan et al. 2001; Chen et al. 2011; Greenspan et al. 2012). Thus, I include as 
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predictors percent of adults earning a bachelor’s degree and percent voting Democrat in 
the 2012 presidential election as proxies for educational level and political leanings.  
 
Table 3.1 gives lists the full set of predictors, several of which I transformed prior to model 
fitting to allow for a more balanced design. Transformations and sources for datasets are 
detailed in Table 3.3. 
 
Analysis 
I use a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) to explain variation in donations at a ZIP code 
level. One limitation of the data is that TNC were only able to provide fundraising effort 
information for ZIP codes that provided donations. Given this, I split my analysis into two 
questions: which predictors explain the presence of a donation in a ZIP? Which predictors 
explain the magnitude of total donations observed in the 15% of ZIP codes with at least 
one gift? To answer the first question (presence-absence of gifts), I used a binomial model 
that does not presume knowledge of fundraising effort (Model 1). To answer the second, I 
focus on the 5215 ZIP codes where gifts were received and for which I had fundraising 
effort data. This time I used a GLM with a negative binomial form to predict the total gift 
amount in dollars from a ZIP code over the 5-year time period (Model 2). The basic model 
specifications are: 
 
Model 1: 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝐸(𝑌𝑖
1|𝑋𝑖
1) ~ 𝛽0
1 +  𝛽𝑋
1 ∗ 𝑋𝑖
1
 
Model 2: 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐸(𝑌𝑖
2|𝑋𝑖
2) ~ 𝛽0
2 +  𝛽𝑋
2 ∗ 𝑋𝑖
2 +  𝛽𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡
2 ∗ 𝑋𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡,𝑖
2
 
 
Here, β indicates the coefficients to be estimated in the GLM, and X is a vector of the 
predictors listed in Table 2.1. Y1 is the propensity of a donation, whereas Y2 represents the 
total dollars donated. Subscript i indicates the ZIP code. Superscripts 1 and 2 respectively 
designate the full national set or donating subset of ZIP codes for each model. I estimate 
the full models and test the beta coefficients for significance from zero. I examined 
variance inflation factors, confirming any collinearity among predictors was within 
acceptable levels to proceed. After the estimation, I checked model residuals for spatial 
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autocorrelation. Model 1 residuals showed a small amount of spatial autocorrelation over 
a 40-km lag, but re-estimating a regression model including spatially lagged error terms 
changed the results little. Therefore, I present the simpler non-spatial model in the main 
text and provide the spatial version in Supplemental materials 2. Finally, I present examples 
based on an analysis of model residuals to show how my work can inform spatial 
fundraising efforts.  
 
Results 
My database of conservation donations included over $350 million (2010 USD) and 
160,000 individual gifts. The size of gifts is skewed as is typical of donation data (Yandow 
2016). The top 50 ZIP codes each contributed a million dollars or more over these 5 years, 
while most gave much smaller amounts with 50% donating $11,000 or less over the same 
time span. Also, gifts were given in only 15% of US ZIP codes. An interpolated map of 
donations highlights both the location and magnitude of giving (Fig 3.1). Most donations 
are made by coastal urban populations with a few central U.S. metropolitan areas like 
Chicago, Denver, and Minneapolis also contributing large sums. 
 
Generalized Linear Model 
I first examined what factors were associated with whether or not a gift was made. 
Population, average income, education, politics, and existing conservation coefficients 
conform with my hypotheses (Model 1, Table 3.1 & 3.2). For example, ZIP codes with 
larger average income and more local protected areas were more likely to have given gifts. 
Conversely, population density, % in poverty, % households with dependents, and % of 
retirement age exhibit unexpected or no effect. I can illustrate more clearly which 
predictors show the greatest association with the presence of donations by standardizing 
the predictors and working in standard deviation units. Total population size and 
educational attainment appear to be the most influential predictors (Fig 3.2). For example, 
ZIP codes in which an additional 10% of adults hold bachelors’ degree are twice as likely 
to provide a donation.  
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Of those ZIP codes that donated money, I sought to explain variation in the total amount 
given. An important component in Model 2 is the estimate of how much effort TNC 
devoted to soliciting donations in each location. Fundraising effort had the greatest ability 
to explain variation in the total amounts being given. Five times the fund-raising effort in 
a ZIP code known to give donations (a standard deviation increase in log(Effort)) 
demonstrated a doubling of the total dollars received. The next most influential predictor 
for size of gift is educational attainment (Fig. 3.2). For a standard deviation increase in 
educational attainment (about 18% of the adult population) in the region, the dollars 
received almost doubles. Additionally, % population of retirement age, and existing 
conservation exhibit coefficient estimates aligning with my hypotheses (Model 2, Table 
3.1 & 3.2). However, total population size in a ZIP code, population density, average 
income, % poverty, political leaning, and % households with dependents either had no 
effect or an effect that was contrary to my hypotheses.  
 
Using Model Residuals to Inform Actions 
By comparing predicted donations from both models against the observed data, I can 
identify places that are donating more or less money than would be expected given local 
conditions. This information would allow an organization to direct fund-raising effort or to 
examine whether there are methods and approaches being used by staff soliciting donations 
from top-giving locations that could be replicated by staff working in locations currently 
giving less than would be expected.  
 
For example, I can identify locations that have a high probability of donating but have not 
done so with Model 1. I estimate 4560 ZIP codes have a high propensity to give and that 
no donations were received from 26% of these ZIP codes (Table 3.4). These locations 
provide prime areas for investigation by TNC to consider reasons for the lack of donor 
activity and perhaps to target for additional fundraising effort. Were these ZIP codes to 
start giving at a comparative rate as currently donating ZIPs, donations would increase by 
22%.  
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Likewise, residuals of Model 2 allow me to identify areas underperforming in total 
donations received from among those ZIP codes that are giving. Performance here is 
defined by the difference between predicted dollar amounts given a ZIP codes 
characteristics and the realized donations from that area. ZIP codes performing well may 
provide templates of success while those showing lower than expected donations may be 
places to review current donor relations and possibly shift fundraising strategies. If 
donations from the lowest performing 200 ZIP codes were elevated to predicted levels, this 
would increase the total revenue observed in the dataset by a further 15%.  
.  
 Discussion 
By examining 160,000 donations to a private land trust, we reveal how sociodemographic 
and other factors explain philanthropic giving to conservation and illustrate methods that 
could be used to unlock additional conservation funding. Our results highlight 
characteristics of a U.S. ZIP code that correlate with the occurrence and size of donations 
for land preservation. Three predictors rise to the top as demonstrating particularly strong 
explanatory power of donations. The strongest predictor of the occurrence of a gift is 
simply total population in that area. Although intuitive, this is an important piece of 
knowledge. This shows that giving behavior is not overwhelmingly from one area or group, 
but is proportional to the population within a ZIP code. Thinking about this in another way, 
one can expect that regardless of where you are fundraising, a certain percent of the 
population are potential donors at this level. In terms of the size of a donation, the strongest 
correlate is fundraising effort. The more instances of contact The Nature Conservancy had 
in an area, the larger donations from that area were likely to be. It is tempting to assume 
that more contact leads to more donations, but it is also likely that TNC contacted people 
more frequently who had already shown high giving propensity in the past. Regardless of 
directionality, there is a strong relationship between contact with donors and size of 
donation received. Confirming this pattern with empirical support should encourage 
organizations to build their stewardship capacity. Finally, the amount of college education 
in an area was a strong predictor in both models and fuels the hypothesis that education 
leads to pro-environmental attitudes (Dietz 1998; Greenspan 2012). 
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Model estimates supported our hypotheses on several regional characteristics. Donations 
to private land protection correlates with areas exhibiting larger proportions of retirement 
age individuals and the existence of other local protected areas. Previous literature has 
claimed that age is a key predictor of giving (Mount 1996). Our results support this, with 
larger donations arising out of areas with greater numbers of older citizens. This pattern 
may hold especially true for our dataset, because older individuals may have increased their 
level of giving to TNC overtime through stewardship interaction and become a middle tier 
donor, therefore visible in our dataset. Existing conservation lands show a positive 
relationship with donations. Although it appears that propensity to give and total size of 
gifts have opposing relationships with protected areas, if examining the parabolic curve 
determine by the estimated coefficients across the relevant sample space, both models in 
fact show an overall positive trend. However, it remains unverified whether exposure to 
conservation increases the propensity to give, or conversely, that areas where funding is 
readily available implement more local protection. 
 
Surprisingly, several commonly held beliefs about giving correlates proved unimportant or 
contrary to established hypotheses. For instance, wealth negatively correlated with 
donation level, while poverty levels in a region was positively correlated with it. This 
challenges literature stating that money availability generally leads to more donations 
(Mount 1996) and suggests new hypotheses about potential giving to conservation from 
areas of high wealth heterogeneity. Additionally, giving negatively correlated with 
households with young dependents despite suppositions that families with children are 
more likely to be interested in conservation work (Bamberg 2003). This pattern may be 
indicative of an ‘available funds’ problem, and that young families are more likely to be 
giving at a low level, which is not visible in this data set. Appealing to young families still 
may be a good way to increase membership and start critical stewardship relationships with 
individuals that will give at higher levels later in life (Zaradic et al. 2009).  
 
The most important contribution of studies like mine is to help increase levels of giving to 
conservation causes. Earlier I outlined two examples of possible increases in fundraising 
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using residuals of the fitted models. Taken together, the effect of encouraging giving where 
preconditions are right but gifts have not been forthcoming and boosting giving from 
underperforming regions show a potential increase of almost 40%. An obvious extension 
to this work is to confirm that these patterns observed with middle tier donations continue 
to hold when considering the smallest and largest donors or other kinds of gifts. One might 
also consider that monetary donations are not the only way to support private conservation 
(Clark 2007; Armsworth et al, 2013). It would be important to look at patterns of land 
donation or volunteerism as a form of giving to land trusts. These other strategies for 
supporting land conservation may or may not follow the same demographic and spatial 
patterns. In addition to revealing current areas to shift fundraising efforts, an improved 
understanding of donation correlates with a dynamic view could assist an organization in 
finding the next place to look. For example, rapidly gentrifying areas are characterized by 
higher levels of poverty, while experiencing an influx of degree holding individuals (both 
correlates of donations). Demographic shifts such as this can happen in a matter of years 
and would signal a source of potential donors for targeting in a capital campaign (Freeman 
& Braconi 2004; Kahn 2007).  
 
Further consideration on the dynamic context of fundraising brings about the possibility of 
optimizing a land trust’s actions across the landscape. Analogous to spatial conservation 
planning (Margules & Pressey 2000; Groves & Game 2016), fundraising should be 
concentrated in places of highest expected return. In the statistical model presented, only 
two predictors of donations are controllable from the point of view of a land trust: 
fundraising and land protection in a region. The location and intensity of these actions on 
the landscape could be regarded as a joint optimization problem where both fundraising 
and conservation actions are placed simultaneously to maximize conservation outcomes, 
with the budget for both being the result of fundraising. Though my results indicate a 
positive correlation of both factors with donations, I do not yet establish the direction of 
these relationships (e.g., does fund-raising effort lead to increased giving or are TNC 
allocating more effort to locations known to have given more in the past?). While my 
results provide an important first step, extending this work with a careful examination of 
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lags (see Larson et al. 2016) or instrumental variable approach (Angrist et al. 1996) would 
help parse out the direction of such relationships with controllable factors to more carefully 
consider decisions of fundraising intensity and land protection in this larger optimization 
framework. Another obvious extension would be to repeat similar analyses for other 
organizations, including smaller conservation organizations with quite different business 
models.  
 
Conservation science has developed a wide array of tools and methods to aid prioritization 
of locations for protection. However, there are many allocation problems inside the regular 
operations of conservation organizations for which advances could be made if more 
scientific effort was shifted toward these broader aspects of land protection practice. To 
illustrate, I focused on fundraising as an enabling factor of conservation and analyzed 
patterns of over $350 million of giving to a nonprofit land trust. This type of research can 
assist organizations to spot regions receiving more or less donations than expected and 
redirect fundraising strategies accordingly. Ultimately, taking advantage of novel 
mechanisms to increase financial resources for land trusts is critical for reaching extensive 
protection targets.   
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Appendix 1: Tables 
Table3.1 Predictors of donation presence and total size.  
Predictors of donation presence and total size. Hypotheses gathered from past literature 
and conversations with conservation practitioners.  
    
Category Metric Beta 
Hypothesis 
Posed Rationale 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
     
Population Total population 
in ZIP code 
+ + Larger populations have more 
individuals to donate  
Population Population 
density (per ha) 
+ + Population density proxy for urban 
which is a strong demographic 
signal 
Wealth Median income + + High levels of wealth indicate 
more expendable income and a 
higher likelihood of donating  
Wealth % Households 
below poverty 
line 
- - Inverse of wealth 
Education % Completed 
bachelor’s 
degree 
+ + Greater educational attainment is 
associated with environmental 
concern and likely to support 
conservation organizations  
Politics % Voted 
Democrat in 
2012 
+ + Liberal politics is associated with 
environmental concern and likely 
to support conservation 
organizations 
Household 
Structure 
% Households 
with young 
dependents  
+ + Individuals with children are 
concerned for the future 
environment, and are likely to 
donate to conservation 
organizations 
Household 
Structure 
% > 65 years 
old 
+ + Retired individuals more likely to 
donate with expendable income, 
legacy or estate donations 
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Table 3.1 Continued 
Category Metric Beta 
Hypothesis 
Posed Rationale 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
     
Existing 
Observable 
Conservation 
Hectares of 
protected areas 
within 75-miles 
+ + Two-way interaction term 
included; Low levels of 
conservation may inspire 
charitable gifts for additional 
conservation actions; high levels of 
conservation may conversely give 
the idea that additional support is 
not needed, and lower the observed 
support;  
Fundraising 
Effort 
Total contacts 
with donors  
NA + Contact moments with donors 
leads to and is led by donations 
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Table 3.2 Generalized linear model results.  
Generalized Linear Model results. Coefficients are from model estimation with raw or log 
transformed predictor data. Each coefficient is tested for overlap with zero with z-test. 
(Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ ) 
   
 Model 1: Is there a donation? 
Logistic Regression 
Model 2: How many dollars? 
Negative Binomial Regression 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
 
       
log 
Population 
1.10 .024 *** -3.86 x 10-3 .022  
log Pop 
Density 
-.219 .015 *** -.080 .014 *** 
log Income .259 .097 ** -.207 .105 * 
log Poverty .145 .039 *** .311 .053 *** 
Education .0817 .0019 *** .0331 .0017 *** 
Politics .788 .150 *** -.123 .145  
Dependents -.0483 .0031 *** -.0179 .0028 *** 
Retirement -.0022 .0025  4.94 x 10-3 .0022 * 
sqrt PAs 1.03 x 10-3 2.11 x 10-3 *** -2.50 x 10-4 1.98 x 10-4  
sqrt PAs2 -3.14 x 10-7 1.47 x 10-7 * 3.99 x 10-7 1.38 x 10-7 ** 
log Effort - - - .386 .011 *** 
 
Null deviance=29921 (28973 df) 
Residual deviance=18168 (28963 df) 
Null deviance=10546 (5267 df) 
Residual deviance=6428 (5256 df) 
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Table 3.3 Details of data sources for generalized linear models 1 & 2.  
      
 Category Metric Year Unit Source 
      
R
es
p
o
n
se
  Donation 
Observation 
Presence of donation in 
ZIP 
Aggregate 
2009-2014 
Binary 
The Nature 
Conservanc
y 
Donation 
Totals 
Aggregate donations in 
ZIP 
Aggregate 
2009-2014 
Dollars 
The Nature 
Conservanc
y 
P
re
d
ic
to
rs
 
 
Population 
Total estimated 
population in ZIP 
2011 
No. individuals 
(log transform) 
ACS 5-year 
estimate 
 
CIESIN 
Gridded 
Population 
of the 
World, V41 
Population density; I 
used the average of two 
estimations. First 
estimation used the 
estimation of population 
and area from the 
American Community 
Survey (ACS) database. 
The second estimation 
used the average value 
within the ZIP from the 
CIESIN raster data. 
2010 
Population/hect
are (log 
transform) 
Wealth 
Average earned income, 
per household 
2011 
Dollars  
(log transform) ACS 5-year 
estimate % households below 
poverty  
2011 
%  
(log transform) 
Education 
% adults having earned a 
Bachelor’s degree or 
higher 
2011 % 
ACS 5-year 
estimate 
Household 
Structure 
% households with 
young dependents  
2011 % 
ACS 5-year 
estimate 
% over 65 2011 % 
ACS 5-year 
estimate 
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Table 3.3 Continued 
      
 Category Metric Year Unit Source 
      
P
re
d
ic
to
rs
 
 
Politics 
% votes for Democratic Party 
2012; County level data 
sourced from Associated 
Press reports and translated to 
ZIP through census relate 
table  
2012 % 
Associated 
Press reported 
outcomes2 
 
U.S. Census 
ZCTA/County 
relates 
Existing 
Observable 
Conservation 
GAP protection level 1 & 2 in 
75 mi buffer from centroid of 
ZIP; 75 mi buffer established 
from Forest Service estimates 
of median travel distance for 
day trip to natural areas.3  
<2009 
Km^2 
(square 
root 
transform) 
PAD-US4 
Fundraising 
effort 
Total number of contact 
records with donors within an 
area in gift dataset 
Aggregate 
2009-2014 
No. of 
Contacts 
(log 
transform) 
The Nature 
Conservancy 
      
 
1Center for International Earth Science Information Network - CIESIN - Columbia 
University. 2016. Gridded Population of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4): Population 
Density. Palisades, NY: NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center 
(SEDAC). http://dx.doi.org/10.7927/H4NP22DQ. Accessed October 2016. 
2https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/nov/07/us-2012-election-county-
results-download 
3Cordell, H. K., C. J. Betz, S.J. Zarnoch. (2013) Recreation and protected lands resources 
in the United States: a technical document supporting the Forest Service 2010 RPA 
assessment. 
4U.S. Geological Survey, Gap Analysis Program (GAP). May 2016. Protected Areas 
Database of the United States (PAD-US), version 1.4 Combined Feature Class.  
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Table 3.4 Contingency table of logistic model 1.  
    
 Model Predicts 
Gift 
Model Predicts No 
Gift 
Exhibited 
Totals 
    
Data Exhibits Gift 3388 2740 6128 
Data Exhibits No Gift 1172 24259 25431 
Predicted Totals 4560 26999  
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Table 3.5 AutoLogistic model vs. non-spatial model coefficient estimate 
In order to test results for unaccounted spatial autocorrelation, a Moran’s I statistic was 
applied to the residual values from both models and was calculated across multiple possible 
interval distances. Model 2 showed no significant autocorrelation in residuals. Model 1 
showed a small amount of remaining spatial autocorrelation in residuals over a 40km lag 
distance. To examine the possible impact of this on my results and interpretation, I use the 
autologistic() function in the R package ngspatial to run a version of Model 1 with spatially 
lagged error terms. The expanded model fit showed a 1.2% reduction in model deviance. 
However, all model coefficients remain of the same sign and of comparable size to the 
simpler model form (Table SI 3). Only average income is impacted by the more 
complicated model fit, with a coefficient less distinguishable from zero, lowering the 
significance and impact of this predictor. Income was already shown to be of little 
predictive value (left hand panel of Fig. 2, “median income”) meaning my interpretations 
of explanatory characteristics remains unchanged. 
   
Variable 
AutoLogistic Model 
Coefficient Estimates 
Main Text GLM 
Coefficient Estimate 
   
Population 1.162 1.10 *** 
Pop Density -.2805  -.219 *** 
Income .0423 .259 ** 
Poverty .151  .145 *** 
Education .0812 .0817 *** 
Politics .400  .788 *** 
Dependents -.0507  -.0483 *** 
Retirement .0030 -.0022   
PAs 8.212 x 10
-4 1.03 x 10-3 *** 
PAs2 -1.150 x 10
-7  -3.14 x 10-7 * 
Eta (spatial parameter) .06353   
 Residual Deviance: 18145 Residual Deviance: 18360 
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Appendix 2: Figures 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Interpolated heat map of continental U.S.  
Dark regions represent donated dollars. Exhibits strong coastal and northern metropolitan 
pattern. Demonstrates both the general location of donative ZIP codes as well as the relative 
magnitude of gifts across regions. 15% of ZIP codes demonstrate a gift with range from 
one thousand to 14 million dollars over the period of data.  
 
104 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Standardized impact of regression variables on giving  
Regression variables ranked by standardized impact on giving (eEstimated Coefficient) for Model 
1 (left panel) and Model 2 (right panel). Each bar represents the multiplicative change of a 
standard deviation increase in that predictor (1= no change). Model 1 shows how a standard 
deviation shift in each predictor variable impacts the odds of observing a donation in a ZIP 
code. E.g. All else being even, an area with 10% more households with young dependents 
(one standard deviation) is half as likely to have observed a donation. Model 2 shows 
relative possible impact of each predictor on the total dollars donated in a ZIP code. E.g. 
All else the same, an area with one standard deviation additional households in poverty is 
predicted to have 22% more dollars donated. This metric is log transformed, so in terms of 
raw data, one standard deviation shift approximates a doubling of households below 
poverty.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Establishment of protected areas is a multifaceted process that involves many linked 
decision points (Pressey & Bottrill 2008; Groves & Game 2016). My dissertation has 
informed various parts of this practice, from design through the financing of protected 
areas. In the introduction to my dissertation, I frame this process as three main questions 
under which my research falls: 
 
1) Where to protect? 
In Chapter 1, I show that simple rules can incorporate connectivity into protected 
area design to better balance management goals (Fig 1.3, Table 1.1). I show the 
impact of spatial configuration on protected area success. Chapter 2 provides 
evidence that there is spatial variability (across TNC state chapters) in the expertise 
and use of loan financing for land protection (Table 2.2). This variation may result 
in differences in the effectiveness of protected area establishment in different 
regions. In Chapter 3, I illustrate fine-scale spatial variation in funding from 
philanthropic sources for conservation that may help to determine where new 
protection would be most feasible (Fig. 3.1). Each of these chapters helps to inform 
the “where” decision that conservation organizations face. 
-  
2) When to protect? 
In Chapter 2, I demonstrate that loan financing for land acquisition can be costly 
and that repayment patterns are variable and difficult to predict (Table 2.2). 
Regardless, loans are critical for enabling timely action for conservation 
opportunities during narrow temporal windows. This research helps to inform the 
decision of whether or not to pursue an opportunity by better establishing cost 
estimates for cost-benefit trade-off considerations by a conservation organization. 
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3) How to fund protection? 
Chapter 2 contributes to the literature on conservation non-profit financing as an 
option for rapid but short-term funding for a proposed acquisition project. Chapter 
3 illustrates locations and demographics with a high propensity to donate to land 
conservation (Fig 3.2, Table 3.4). I demonstrate how the use of models and 
stewardship data can help target fundraising strategies toward areas of high 
potential support, thereby augmenting resources for conservation action. 
 
Synthesis 
Several themes emerge across the three research projects in this dissertation (Fig. C1), of 
which I highlight three in this Conclusion section: i) trade-offs in conservation decision 
making for practitioners; ii) flexibility or release from constraints for conservation 
decisions; and iii) the ability or need to scale up in terms of large protected areas to aid 
conservation goals. 
 
Figure C1. Intersection of themes across dissertation projects 
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Objective Trade-offs 
The process of protected area establishment is riddled with trade-offs, where gaining a little 
more of one objective costs a little of another. If all objectives for a decision could be 
achieved easily by a single choice, no problem would exist. Two major categories of trade-
offs that conservation organizations face are trade-offs in benefit functions given various 
on-the-ground conservation action choices, and trade-offs across options for investing 
resources inside the organization to best pursue organizational missions. My dissertation 
informs decision-making in both of these categories.  
 
As part of their mission, conservation organizations may target multiple conflicting 
ecological benefits or struggle to balance conservation goals with human use goals 
(Polasky et al. 2008; Goldstein et al. 2012). This results in difficult decisions about 
resource investment into alternate regions, as well as about protected area shape and 
management (Groves & Game 2016). In Chapter 1, I look within an ecosystem type to 
explore one example of a design decision that trades offs between conservation and 
extractive use management goals. When establishing a near-shore marine protected area 
(MPA), alternative size and spacing configurations can support conservation or fishery 
goals to different extents (Botsford, Micheli & Hastings 2003). I demonstrate this trade-off 
in a highly-protected system where few large well-placed MPAs best support a wild fish 
population, whereas many small MPAs better support a large fishery catch. Alternatively, 
I highlight synergistic scenarios in over-fished systems with dispersal knowledgeable 
managers. This research illustrates how the size and spacing of segments composing the 
protected area affect the benefits received, even when the total area protected remains 
unchanged. 
 
When zooming out to a multiregional scale, organizations face a trade-off between benefits 
across different regions, which are directly tied to threat of habitat conversion. On land, 
protection often requires ownership, so a large cost of protection is the price of the land. 
Land price is highly correlated with threat of development, (Naidoo et al. 2006) and thus 
purchasing decisions draw a trade-off between more land in a less threatened region versus 
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less land in a more highly threatened region. This trade-off has been frequently discussed 
in the conservation literature (Ando & Shah 2010; Withey et al. 2012). However, missing 
in these past studies is a recognition that other factors also co-vary with land cost and threat 
that might ameliorate this trade-off. Specifically, in Chapter 3, I show that donations to 
conservation are also more likely in population dense areas. This means that it may be 
easier to fundraise for the land near cities, mitigating the higher cost. My insights into 
bridge loans in Chapter 2 also help inform a land trust on its ability to afford land 
acquisitions in expensive markets. By incorporating these considerations of fundraising 
and borrowing, my analysis adjusts the affordability of lands and lowers barrier for 
protecting in high-threat regions. 
 
Trade-offs among options for investment and management of financial resources within 
the organization impose choices upon conservation non-profits that will impact 
performance. For example, land-protecting organizations often face a choice about whether 
to borrow money to pursue new protection projects. Inside of this decision, the classic risk 
– return trade-off emerges. With expensive projects, the potential for a high ecologic 
benefit exists, but if a loan is needed, financial risks arise. Risks can include loss of 
collateral or the property, loss of reputation or credit, and loss of other opportunities that 
arise while money is out of hand (Clark 2007). My research shows that more expensive 
projects rack up higher financial costs beyond purchase price. This means that when using 
debt financing to pursue large projects, conservation organizations take on more risk. 
Taking on some debt benefits the organization by leveraging money to help them grow 
(Bowman 2002). However, finding the right leverage balance is important, and many non-
profits choose to minimize debt held by the organization (Young 2007; Bowman 2015). 
My research provides a first step towards better estimations of cost and risk burdens of 
conservation specific loans. 
 
Organizations also face a trade-off in determining how to invest resources internally across 
mission-oriented or capacity-building work. In many land trust non-profits, mission-
oriented work may include buying land or easements, whereas capacity building might be 
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the creation of an endowment or revolving fund, or educational or fundraising campaigns 
(Bowman 2007; Duff et al. 2017). My research helps to inform conservation groups about 
the risk and costs associated with establishing internal revolving funds. My work also 
informs the decision about where to target expanded fundraising efforts. Areas of high 
potential for fundraising may trade off or overlap with areas of ecological benefits. 
Through this work, I also provide insight on improving the return on investment targeting 
of fundraising so that capacity-building investments are as efficient as possible.  
 
An important future step to this research is identifying locations where synergies are 
possible between capacity-building and mission-growing work for conservation 
organizations. To attain this key piece of information, we would need to determine direct 
paths of causality between land protection work and realized donations, as well as resolve 
the willingness to pay of donors for conservation across varying distances. This link 
between on-the-ground actions and philanthropy would help to identify areas where 
investing in conservation can both bolster conservation goals and encourage donations, 
thereby increasing monetary resources for more protection. 
 
Flexibility of Actions and Policy 
A widely recognized principle in the context of protected area establishment is that 
organizations with greater flexibility regarding the placement of protected areas and 
management activity have a greater ability to optimize ecological benefits on the landscape 
(Kark et al. 2009; Micheli et al. 2013). Within my research, I explore constraints on 
flexibility of conservation actions through the dimensions of space and time.  
 
First, I consider spatial flexibility of protected area establishment, i.e. an organization’s 
ability to place protection in whatever location and in whatever configuration best 
maximizes the desired ecological benefits. With my protected area design study in Chapter 
1, I explore this in two dimensions: i) how performance of a protected area changes as more 
protection is added to the system; and ii) how performance changes as the protected areas 
are broken up into a greater number of unique areas. Breaking up protected area networks 
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into many small protected sites can have the confounding factor of making enforcement 
more difficult, a realistic constraint on potential configurations. Regardless, my research 
shows the benefit side of added flexibility especially in scenarios where knowledge about 
dispersal is limited and configurations cannot be optimized. In this scenario, many small 
MPAs can create a more productive fishery. 
 
Spatial positioning of protection can be constrained not only by enforcement 
considerations, but also by affordability. Conservation actions may be constrained by the 
local fundraising base, and therefore it is critical to understand the landscape for potential 
philanthropy to better prioritize conservation actions across space. In my research on 
fundraising, I provide a benchmark for fundraising for land trusts. From this they can 
identify areas that are most likely to support local conservation, and regions where it is 
more critical to find spatially flexible funds such as federal grants. 
 
The pervasiveness of mismatches between project costs and on-hand funds highlights the 
importance of temporal flexibility of conservation actions for maximizing benefits on the 
landscape. The availability of funds, together with the timing of parcel availability, impose 
a major constraint on land protection decisions (Lennox et al. 2016). If funds are not readily 
available, then temporally flexible funding becomes a crucial option. Flexible funding 
includes borrowing money for acquisition and reselling the property later to a partner 
organization. By considering loans as an enabling factor of purchase, I explore how 
releasing this temporal constraint helps to build more opportunities for land trusts to pursue 
projects. Loans specifically allow an organization to use future income to buy a desired 
parcel on the land market right now. 
 
My work on the flexibility of conservation actions also suggests several important next 
steps and extensions. For example, conservation loan financing, though applied in both 
terrestrial and marine settings, has been almost absent from the marine protection literature 
(but see Novriyanto et al. 2012; Bos, Pressey & Stoeckl 2015). A clear extension of my 
work in Chapter 2 is to examine the costs and risks associated with marine conservation 
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loans. Another valuable area of extension work concerning conservation finance is to more 
clearly establish the frequency with which opportunities for acquisition arise on the market, 
and the quality of those opportunities. This would allow researchers to more clearly 
establish the benefit of and opportunity cost of land acquisition loans.  
 
Scaling Up 
Finally, throughout my research, I show that bigger can be better when it comes to 
establishing conservation protected areas, and provide insight into some enabling factors 
for growing the size of protected area projects. 
 
It is well established in the literature that large protected areas maintain intactness and 
connectivity of ecosystems. Interior habitat in large terrestrial protected areas is valuable 
(Woodroffe 1998) and protected area size is a key trait for successful conservation 
outcomes in marine environments (Edgar et al. 2014). In my research, I provide a further 
example of the benefits of large MPAs. For spatially-managed reef systems, I illustrate that 
a large protected area can provide not only conservation benefits, but also natural resource 
extraction benefits in situations where optimal targeting is possible. Given the asymmetric 
dispersal of my population model, large well-placed MPAs can better grow a wild fish 
population while supplying the fishery through a spillover effect than numerous smaller 
MPAs. 
 
In order to realize large-scale conservation areas, organizations need to take more 
collaborative actions and have access to financial tools that allow them to scale up. As my 
research highlights, by providing flexible financing options, revolving loan funds are 
perfect for enabling smaller organizations to pursue larger land acquisition deals for which 
they would otherwise not have ready funds. Organizations can also scale up their work by 
better appealing to donors. In my research, I provide examples of how efficient targeting 
of locations and individuals for fundraising purposes allow for augmentation of income for 
a land trust. 
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All three of my chapters demonstrate that optimizing for large scale conservation is a 
worthwhile pursuit. Future research could help to better target this objective by building 
joint optimization frameworks where decisions of fundraising, costs, threat and benefits 
are all connected on the landscape. In such a framework, actions would be simultaneously 
controlled for a large working budget and large protected areas. Organizational and 
conservation investment actions would impact both the budget and the protection portfolio. 
Subsequently, the land protection actions available would be constrained by the budget 
size. 
 
Final Thoughts 
My dissertation provides impactful research to aid conservation decision making that 
balances trade-offs and flexibility to enable large scale protected area design and 
implementation. Throughout my research, I have worked closely with practitioners and 
international decision science groups to ensure that my research has real-world relevance. 
 
While developing this dissertation, I have invested time in engaging with and 
communicating my science and recommendations to relevant stakeholders. Early on, I gave 
seminars on the results of my reef model work to research groups in Australia, including 
coral reef scientists and fishery managers at the Institute for Marine and Antarctic studies 
in Tasmania. I have communicated the results of my collaborations with The Nature 
Conservancy not only with their staff, whom it directly informs, but also have engaged 
with members of the land trust community in conferences and meetings to better forge 
communication pathways to disseminate results. These types of valuable interactions 
between academic institutes and practitioners help to create novel opportunities for cutting 
edge research while contributing up-to-date science in support of real-world conservation 
solutions.  
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